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Toward a New Constitutional
Anatomy
V. F. Nourse*
Thereis an importantsense in which our Constitution's structure is not what
it appears to be- a set of activities orfunctions or geographies, the "judicial"or
the "executive" or the "legislative" power, the "truly local and the truly
"
national. Indeed, it is only if we put these notions to the side that we can come to
grips with the importance of the generative provisions of the Constitution: the
provisions that actually create our federal government; that bind citizens,
through voting, to a House of Representatives, to a Senate, to a President, and
even, indirectly, to a Supreme Court. In this Article, I contend that the deep
structureof the Constitutionis not a set of functions or geographies, but rather a
political economy of relations between the governed and the governing. Based on
standard assumptions common in institutional economics, I argue that these
relations create incentives that can help us predict real (rather than simply
theoretical) risks to structural change in actual cases involving both the
separation of powers and federalism. By considering the risk from shifting
relations not to activity-descriptionbut instead to majorities and minorities, we
may come closer to understanding real risks to shifting power, from states to
nation and from one national department to another. To this end, against the
backdrop of constitutional law, I bring to bear the converging meanings of
history,political science, and lost constitutional text, all of which reveal that the
canonical view of our Constitution is quite partial to courts and provides an
incompletepicture of our Constitutionas a whole.
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Introduction
"Athinkingbeing can, accordingly,act on the basis of the absent and thefuture, "i
"Thefederal and State governmentsare infact but differentagents and trusteesof
the people, constitutedwith differentpowers, and designedfor differentpurposes.
Theadversaries of the Constitutionseem to have lost sight of thepeople altogether
in their reasonings on this subject, and to have viewed these different
establishments,not only as mutualrivals and enemies, but as uncontrolledby any
common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These
gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the
ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people
alone. . . ."2

By the end of the twentieth century, constitutional law and commentary
had been preoccupied for decades with the question of judicial review.3 This
preoccupation focused courts and commentators on the subject of the
question- the judiciary. Theories of judicial review soon became theories of
judicial interpretationand theories of judicial interpretationbecame questions
about judicial function (analysis of texts, history, and precedent).4 This focus
l. John Dewey, How We Think 14 (1910).
2. The Federalist No. 46, at 3 15 (JamesMadison)(JacobCooke ed., 196 1).
3. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics (1962); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of
the Constitution (1982); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National
Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court
(1980); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980).
4. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991) (setting forth a
set of interpretivemodalities);RichardH. Fallon, Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theoryof
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should seem odd if one is concerned about the structure of the Constitution as a
whole. After all, the courts are only one of three departments and arguably the
least powerful. Indeed, one must wonder whether a theory that begins with the
courts' view of the Constitution will simply end there. Put another way, the risk
is that, in the name of judicial review, courts will look into a Constitution with
three departmentsand find only one- thejudicial one.
This question of structure has become only more important now that
scholars have begun moving away from what I will call the "judiciocentric
position"- the search for a theory of judicial review. New work on popular
constitutionalism (emphasizing that constitutional interpretation is undertaken
outside of courts5 and that judicial review has its origins in popular ideals)6
makes this question particularly salient. For if constitutional meaning is
policentric,7 if other institutions are capable of deciding and likely to decide
constitutional questions, how are basic structural matters to be determined?
Should Congress decide questions about the separation of powers? Should the
people, in their multivalent social movements,8 decide questions of the
allocation of power between states and nation? Popular constitutionalism thus
raises important and unaddressed questions for constitutional structure as a
whole. In this Article, I offer a way of implementing a more holistic, more
populist view of structuralmatters. I reject the judiciocentric position that the
separation of powers and federalism require recourse to descriptive texts or

Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987) (disputing Bobbin's
interpretivematrix); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivismand Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1983) (critiquinginterpretive
approaches); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1067 (1980) (defending a theory of the
Constitutionintendedto protectfundamentalvalues againstprocess-basedinterpretations).
5. Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts ( 1999).
6. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review (forthcoming May 2004) [hereinafter Kramer, Popular
Constitutionalism] .
7. On the definition of policentric constitutionalinterpretation,see Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric
Interpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003):
The policentric model holds that for purposes of Section 5 power the Constitution should be
regarded as having multiple interpreters, both political and legal. The model attributes equal
interpretive authority to Congress and to the Court. The model thus entails (1) that Congress
does not violate principles of separation of powers when it enacts Section 5 legislation
premised on an understanding of the Constitution that differs from the Court's, and (2) that
Congress's action does not bind the Court, so that the Court remains free to invalidate Section
5 legislation that in the Court's view violates a constitutional principle requiring judicial
protection. This account of Section 5 power combines a robust legislative constitutionalism
with a vigorous commitment to rule-of-law values.

8. I am referringhere to the work within the "Constitutionoutside the courts"field that
has focused on social movements. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,Jr., Channeling:IdentityBased Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419 (2001); William N.
Eskridge,Jr., Some Effects of Identity-BasedSocial Movementson ConstitutionalLaw in the
TwentiethCentury,100 MICH.L. REV.2062 (2002).
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functions9 and argue, instead, that our government is, in important structural
senses, a set of popular relations. Once one takes that view, one can predict
with far greater confidence real risks to the people from structuralchange.10
The Constitution was created first and foremost to govern, not for the sake
of constitutional interpretation.xx The revolution of 1787 was hailed as the
moment not of the courts' arrival or the advent of a new interpretive regime,
but rather of a new relation between the people and their government. In this
sense, the Constitution is not only a text for interpreting,but is also an "act," a
"constituting."12"[Constitutions not only limit power and prevent tyranny,
they also construct power."13 For all one would know from theories of
constitutional interpretationand judicial review, however, this constituting, this
activity of generating a government, is unimportant; according to the
judiciocentric position, the Constitution conveys meanings rather than
constructs power, it refers to the past and dictionaries rather than to the future
and our real-life relations to one another. I believe that the judiciocentric view
of the Constitution is partial and I believe that the Constitution- the whole
Constitution- itself tells us this.14
To get a quick sense of how unrealistic the view from the judiciocentric

9. Please note that when I use the term "function," I am not referring to
"functionalism,"which is a particularschool of thought associated with the analysis of
separationof powers questions.See infra text accompanyingnote 37. Instead,I am referring
to the idea that a departmentor a doctrine might have a "purpose"we tend to think of as a
"function." That includes doctrines that are typically associated with the separation of
powers (executive, legislative, judicial) as well as doctrines typically associated with
federalism(the "trulylocal" or "trulynational,"see United States v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598,
617(2000)).
10. Of course, the "people" is an abstractionthat requires a temporal qualifier. Jed
Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Self-Government 168 (2001) (arguingthat
"writtenconstitutionalismholds that a people achieves self-governmentnot by conforming
governance to the authoritativedemocraticwill at any given time, but by laying down and
holding itself to its own democratically authored foundationalcommitments over time").
Indeed, I think one of the majoradvantagesof a constitutiveview is that it permitsa kind of
dynamism about the "people," while seeking to ensure against major dislocations of the
representativerelation.
11. The most recent and eloquent claim in this regard is that made by LarryKramer.
See Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6.
12. Akhil Reed Amar, The SupremeCourt 1999 Term:Foreword: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 35 (2000).
13. Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal
Democracy 6 (1995); see also Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 143 (1963) ("The word
'constitution'. . . means the act of constitutingas well as the law or rules of governmentthat
are 'constituted.'"); id. at 148 (arguing that the founders aimed to understand "the
constitutionof power"); id. at 150 ("[T]he principle of the separationof power . . . actually
providesa kind of mechanism. . . throughwhich new power is constantlygenerated.. . .").
14. In the effort to insist on this position, I am standing on the shoulders of many,
including,most especially, ProfessorsAckermanand Black. See Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Foundations (1991); Charles Black, Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law ( 1969).
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position can be, just focus on a few key structuralterms: the words "executive,"
"judicial," and "legislative," as they appear in the vesting clauses.15 These are
the terms that form the central focus of structural controversies and academic
commentary on those controversies.16 Now commit interpretive heresy:
eliminate these terms from the document. Do courts cease deciding cases? Does
the government halt its operations? Hardly. Indeed, very little happens to our
government if these three words are excised from the text's vesting clauses.
Now, eliminate the practices of government generated by the text- the
practices of voting and representation- and what happens? There is no
Congress, there is no one in the White House, and there is no one to appoint
Supreme Courtjustices; in fact, there is no government at all.17
This raises an important question: Why is it that lawyers and courts have
subordinated these practices to other texts, why have they subordinated
relations that "govern" to words "to be interpreted?"One answer is that the
judiciocentric position tends to privilege parts of the document; those parts that
seem most like "ordinary"statute-law,18that look as if they can or should be

15. See U.S. Const, art.I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers hereingrantedshall be vested in
a Congress of the United States
"); U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power
shall be vested in a Presidentof the United States of America.");U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1
("Thejudicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supremeCourt,and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").Despite the
scholarly focus on these clauses, they have little impact on constitutinggovernmentand its
practices. By contrast,clauses such as those institutingvoting and describingthe mannerof
elections have not received the attentionthey deserve. See infra note 17.
16. Academic commentary, conservative and liberal alike, has tended to take the
functionalterms in the vesting clauses as a startingpoint. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz,Realism in
Separation of Powers Thinking,30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 343 (1989) (taking a functional
and liberal position); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement:
Some Lessons from History, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 275 (1989) (using a traditionally
conservative position (reliance on history) to advocate a different view of the meaning of
"executive");MartinH. Redish & ElizabethJ. Cisar, "IfAngels Wereto Govern'': TheNeed
for Pragmatic Formalism in Separationof Powers Theory,41 DUKEL.J. 449 (1991) (taking
a pragmaticformalistposition). Most if not all of the SupremeCourt's cases on separationof
powers tend to proceed from understandingsthat depend upon the idea of function.See, e.g.,
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (concluding that an individual lawsuit would not
impermissibly interfere with "judicial"or "executive" functions); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986) (concluding that "executive"power had been entrustedto an officer over
whom there was "legislative" control); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (opinions
disagreeing over whether the legislative veto should be characterized as legislative,
adjudicative,or a standarddelegationto the executive).
17. U.S. Const, art. I, §§ 2-3 (establishingthe process by which membersof the House
of Representativesand the Senate are elected); U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. Const.
art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. Const, amend. XII (creating the process by which
presidents are elected); U.S. Const, amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of
senators). It is these bodies, in turn, which nominate and confirm Supreme Courtjustices.
U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (grantingthe Presidentthe power, subjectto Senate approval,to
appointjustices to the SupremeCourt).
18. On the importantdifference between the Constitutionas fundamentallaw and as
ordinary law, see Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6. For a full
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"interpreted,"or that fit with an ideal of what the judiciary does and can do
(reading texts and precedents). In such a world, however, it seems fair to ask
whether our government has been imagined by courts in their own image.19
In this Article, I try to show that an alternative view - a constitutive
view - of the Constitution can better enable us to understand important
questions about constitutional structure. At the center of the idea of a
constitutive position is the notion of an economy of vertical relations between
the governed and the governing, relations that create what we conventionally
call the separation of powers and federalism. I then apply basic principles
drawn from the literature on political economy (and, in particular, institutional
economics) to flesh out an alternate view of the implications when we shift
power from one set of governing relations to another. To this end, I take the
unusual position of considering risks both to majorities and minorities from
shifting structural relations (thus considering risks found in the literature on
public choice and positive political theory along with the more conventional
constitutional concern regarding risks to minorities). I then apply this analysis
to some traditional problems surrounding separation of powers and federalism
caselaw. I have chosen ratherwell-known problems because I want to show not
only that this theory improves our understanding of the "whole" text, but also
that understanding the constitutive Constitution can do important work in
predicting realistic risks to governance.
In Part I, I recount a conventional way of viewing structural problems,
shared in the law of federalism and the separation of powers, and offer a
competing vision - one which conceives constitutional structure less as an
allocation of functions or textual descriptions (executive, judicial, etc.) than as
an allocation of real-life constituencies and their relationships to different parts
of our government. In this Part, I develop a model that focuses on the way in
which the constitutive provisions of the Constitution20create relations between
the governed and governing, and I argue that "function" (whether it be the
function denoted by the term "executive" or "judicial" or that by the "truly
exposition of this argument,see infra PartIV.
19. I confess that 1 have feared this for some time, see Victoria F. Nourse, Making
ConstitutionalDoctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1401 (1997), because it is in
the natureof all institutionsto "thinkthemselves."See Mary Douglas, How Institutions
Think 55 (1986) ("Nothing else but institutions can define sameness. Similarity is an
institution. Elements get assigned to sets where institutions find their own analogies in
nature.").
20. By "constitutiveprovisions,"I mean the provisions of the Constitutionthatprovide
for elections of Congress and the President and appointmentof Supreme Court Justices.
These provisions include: Article I, Section 2, creating a House of Representativeswhose
membersare to be elected by the people aggregatedby population;and Article I, Section 3,
creatinga Senate whose membersare to be elected, now, by the people of the states;Article
II, Section 1, providing for the election of the Presidentby the nation throughan electoral
college; and Article II, Section 2, providing for the appointmentof the Supreme Court
justices by the nationally elected Presidentand their confirmationby the state populationelected Senate.
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local" and the "truly national") serves as too crude a proxy for more refined,
off-stage, and often-conflicting, normative judgments about risks to majorities
and minorities.
In Parts II and III, I illustrate how this all "works," by applying it to
familiar, but recurrent,problems of categorical contradiction in both separation
of powers and federalism cases (specifically, Chadha and Morrison). It is here
that I argue that a political economy of relations is more predictive of real
structuralrisk than current linguistic contenders. If we look not at functions but
instead at shifting political relations, we can far better assess risks to the
people, whether these are risks to majorities or minorities. In both of these
parts, I urge that structuralissues conventionally considered to be quite distinct
(federalism and the separation of powers) are implied in each other- that
separation of powers cases have implied federalism dimensions and federalism
cases have implied separation of powers dimensions. Finally, in Part IV, I
consider the most important question: Why has the judiciocentric position
helped us to create theories that silence the Constitution's generativity, its
creation of power? For in such silencing, we have (inadvertently or not) ended
up privileging dictionaries over voting, interpretive modes over
representationalrelations, and judicial supremacy over popular governance.
I. Rethinking Conventional

Structural

Wisdom

If there is a shared problem in the doctrines of federalism and the
separation of powers, it is due at least in part to a shared assumption about the
constitutional text. Although the relevant texts in federalism and separation of
powers cases are thought to differ, judicial approaches toward these problems
share an assumption that there are governing descriptive texts and that these
texts must be matched with the activities under review. The relevant
constitutional language is viewed as a set of descriptive labels, a set of terms
like "executive," "state," or "judicial" (terms that seem ripe for definition or
drawing boundaries), and texts are then matched against the challenged practice
under review. In structuralcases, whether ones of federalism or the separation
of powers, it is thought enough for a court, for example, to dub the President a
lawmaker;21to find a "traditionalgovernmental function";22or to insist that a
particularactivity involves "executive" power.23

21. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) ("In the
frameworkof our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutesthe idea thathe is to be a lawmaker.").
22. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) ("We hold that insofar
as the challenged amendmentsoperate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditionalgovernmentalfunctions, they are not within the
authoritygrantedCongress. . . .").
23. Morrisonv. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describingthe
President'spower as unitary:"[T]his does not mean some o/the executive power, but all of
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A. The Matching Game
It is precisely this effort, this "matching game," that has created such
difficulty with the Supreme Court's structuraldecisions. In both separation of
powers cases and federalism cases, the twentieth century has seen repeated
failures of doctrine; almost every critical adjective imaginable has been thrown
at structuraldoctrine, from "unpredictable"to "abysmal" to "contradictory."24
In the past fifty years, the law of constitutional structurehas vacillated between
categorical enthusiasm and distaste; aggressive judicial enforcement and
contrite deference to the political branches; judicial review and no judicial
review. In both federalism25 and separation of powers cases,26 courts and
commentators have moved from formalism to functionalism and back to
formalism again.27

the executive power").
24. Stephen L. Carter,From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent
De-Evolutionof the Separation of Powers, 1987 BYU L. Rev. 719, 760-61 (stating that the
courts' conflicting traditions in the separationof powers amount to "muddlingthrough,"
leaving one "rarelyable from one year to the next to predict how the Justices will view the
next problemto arise");E. Donald Elliott, WhyOur Separationof Powers JurisprudenceIs
So Abysmal, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 506 (1989) (suggesting, as the article's title indicates,
the poverty of the case law); Philip Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of
Separation of Powers, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 601 (1986) (arguing that the doctrine is not
consistent and that its coherency, if any, comes from the actions- often contradictory
which spurthe doctrine'sconsideration).
25. The post-New Deal academic cycle in federalism begins with Wechsler's claim
that courts should defer to the political process. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in Composition and Selection of the
National Government,54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). This is met with Van Alstyne's
disbelief. See William W. Van Alstyne, TheSecond Death of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1709, 1724 n.64 (1985) (indicatingthat the Wechslerpolitical process argument(adoptedby
Justice Blackmunin Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)) was
little better than "a good heartedjoke"). The Wechsler argumenthas been ever so elegantly
resurrectedby LarryKramer,with the aid of some standardpolitical science. See LarryD.
Kramer,Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguardsof Federalism, 100 COLUM.
L. Rev. 215 (2000); LarryD. Kramer,UnderstandingFederalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485
H. RlKER,FEDERALISM:
(1994) [hereinafterKramer, Understanding];see also WILLIAM
Origin, Operation, Significance (1964).
26. In the separation of powers area, the post-New Deal embrace of functionalism
(tantamount to deference) begins with the embrace of Steel Seizure's "workable"
government formula. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).That formulationis met by the Unitarians,on the one hand, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992), and by the originalistson the other, see
Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term: The IndependentCounsel Mess, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 105 (1988) [hereinafter Carter, Independent Counsel], only to have
pragmatism reworked by Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein (in translated mode), see
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,94 COLUM.
L.
Rev. 1 (1994).
27. The distinctionbetween formalismand functionalismis a staple of much academic
commentary on both federalism and the separation of powers. See Rebecca L. Brown,
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Indeed, the stock stories academic commentators tell about both federalism
and the separation of powers are moralized as tales of the wisdom and dangers
of formalism. For example, in federalism matters, there is the cautionary
narrative of the New Deal, where the Court reversed the grave indignity of
earlier attempts to corral "commerce" as "manufacture." That narrative,
however, has hardly discouraged the Supreme Court from flirting once again
with formalism. In the 1980s, the Court attempted to revive the Tenth
Amendment through the rubric of "traditional state functions,"28 an attempt
that soon failed once the rubric became too difficult to manage.29 More
recently, we have seen evidence of a new kind of formalist cycle, with
categories ascendant in United States v. Lopez and New Yorkv. United States,
cases that have given us new tests for "economic" activity and
"anticommandeering."30Only time will tell how long it will be before this
Supreme Court finds that its new federalism categories cannot be managed.
A similar tale can be told about the separation of powers cases. By the
decade after the New Deal, it was thought that formalism had been routed in
the law of separated powers. The move toward a more pragmatic view was
canonized in casebooks with Justice Jackson's celebrated concurrence in the
Steel Seizure case.31 With the fame of Justice Jackson's call for a "workable
government"32 came judicial decisions that were far more deferential to
politically inspired structuralinnovation.33But, as was the case with federalism
doctrine, this temporary equilibrium did not last. By the middle of the 1980s,

Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1522-31 (1991)
(contrastingformal and functionalapproachesin separationof powers cases); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties:U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,109 Harv. L. Rev. 78,
92-95 (1995) (contrasting formal and functional approaches in federalism cases). For a
wonderfullyilluminatingdialogue on these conflicting views, see H. Jefferson Powell & Jed
Rubenfeld, Laying It on the Line: A Dialogue on Line Item Vetoes and Separation of
Powers, 47 Duke L.J. 1171 (1998).
28. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
29. See Garciav. San Antonio Metro.TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
30. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992). For more recent usages of these categories, see United States v. Morrison,529
U.S. 598 (2000) (applying the Lopez economic/commercialstandard)and Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (applyingNew York'santicommandeeringrule).
31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
32. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)("While the Constitutiondiffuses power the
betterto secure liberty, it also contemplatesthat practicewill integratethe dispersedpowers
into a workablegovernment.").
33. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (using the "workablegovernment"principle announcedin
Steel Seizure to reject the President'sclaim of absolute privilege as against a subpoena);see
also United States v. Cowan, 396 F. Supp. 803, 805 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (holding that the
"appointmentby a court of special prosecutorsto prosecutea valid existing indictmentis not
incongruouswith the separationof powers doctrine"and citing the "workablegovernment"
formulation).
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categorical formalism was on the rise again. In a series of decisions, the
Supreme Court appeared to reinvigorate a formal tripartite branch division.34
The movement was never as uniform as in the federalism sphere,35 but it was
distinctive, turning the law full circle to the categorical days when Justice
Black and, before him, Chief Justice Taft, declared that powers simply were
"lawmaking" or "executive" and that this was sufficient to resolve the
dispute.36
Much of the academic commentary on both federalism and the separation
of powers has tended to suggest that "functionalism" must be the wiser, more
liberal approach. But, as others have pointed out, and as I have tried to
demonstrate elsewhere, there is a kind of formalism built into this aspiration
toward a kinder, gentler functionalist doctrine.37 Functionalism, too, relies
upon categorical boundaries: One must compare some descriptive or labeling
claim with another- whether it is labeling the challenged practice or labeling
the status quo as "executive," "legislative," or as a "traditionalstate function."
The formalist asks how to describe the challenged practice and then seeks a
close match between that description and "existing" descriptions of the
departments. The functionalist asks a similar question, but differs in the degree
of the "match"required, asking whether the challenged practice undermines the
definition of an existing department or state function defined, again, by
descriptive label. As Mark Tushnet wrote long ago, formalism and
functionalism in structural matters are not opposed in their methodology but
only in their advocated results and attitude toward structural change.38 The

34. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down the GrammRudman-Hollingsbudget act); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down the
legislative veto).
35. There were notable lapses in the formal model, lapses that have since come to be
regretted by many. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (applying a
"functional" approach after the Court had begun to adopt more "formal" analyses).
Similarly, the functionalist"period"was more of an assumptionthan a set of holdings- an
assumptionbased largely on cases generatedby the controversyover the Watergatetapes.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (adopting a formal approach in the
"functional"era).
36. See YoungstownSheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 587 ("In the frameworkof our
Constitution,the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.");Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) ("The
ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general administrative
control of the Presidentby virtue of the general grantto him of the executive power, and he
may properlysupervise and guide their constructionof the statutesunder which they act in
order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the
Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President
alone.").
37. Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKEL.J. 749 (1999)
[hereinafter Nourse, Vertical Separation]', see also Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing
Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers
Theory,66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 581, 596 (1992) [hereinafterTushnet,Bowls and Plateaus].
38. Tushnet, Bowls and Plateaus, supra note 37, at 604. For a different, and
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formalist looks for perfect descriptive symmetry while the functionalist is
willing to tolerate greater structural innovation. Functional analysis aspires,
clearly, to a greater realism and yet, too often, it simply shifts the burden,
beginning and ending with a greater tolerance for change, no matter the
consequences of that change.
B. The Constitution of Power
I seek to investigate the constitution of power as much as its description
and thus, to understand the effects of shifting governmental structure on
relations between the governed and the governing.39 To undertake this inquiry,
one need not give up on text or history, nor don the hat of a political scientist.40
One must simply give up the judiciocentric position- the idea that the only
constitutional texts worth applying or understanding are what I will call the
"descriptive texts," the texts that describe the departments or levels of
government (either in terms of "functions" or what we call "powers"). Instead,
one must focus on a different set of texts that, quite literally, "constitute"
government,41that create practices that I call the Constitution's "vertical" and
"horizontal"relations.
Let us begin with an effort at imaginative reconstruction. Imagine that you
were at the Constitutional Convention. And imagine further that you were
trying to form a government. Would you begin to determine the contours of
illuminating,view to the contrary,see Powell & Rubenfeld,supra note 27, at 1204-05.
39. This is an attemptat "explanationby embodiment,"one that looks to the practiceof
governing and the relations embedded within it. See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of
Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 5-6 (2001).
40. Having said this, I cast no aspersionson the discipline of political science. Indeed,
many of my conclusions are quite consistent with the predictionsof positive political theory.
See infra notes 80, 81, 148; see also Jenna Bednar, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn,A Political Theoryof Federalism, in Constitutional Culture and Democratic
Rule 223 (John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove & JonathanRiley eds., 2001) (arguing that our
constitutionalstructureand, in particular,federalism,is attractivebut problematic,given the
claims of positive political theory that a decentralized system best satisfies popular
preferences). It is simply that I reject the notion that these cases are "too hard"for courts
because courts lack the capacity to understandthe political departments.See, e.g., Tushnet,
Bowls and Plateaus, supra note 37, at 596 (doubting that judges have the political
experience or capacity to use "social science" informationto apply "functional"models of
the separationof powers). The SupremeCourt has a constitutionalobligation to understand
the entire Constitution,including those parts of the Constitutionthat constitute the political
departments.
41. These provisions include Article I, Section 2, creating a House of Representatives
whose members are to be elected by the people aggregated by population; and Article I,
Section 3, creating a Senate whose members are to be elected, now, by the people of the
states. See also U.S. Const, amend. XVII. The representationaltexts also include Article II,
Section 1, providing for the election of the President by the nation through an electoral
college and Article II, Section 2, providing for the appointment of the Supreme Court
Justices by the nationally elected Presidentand their confirmationby the state-populationelected Senate.
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federalism by defining the term "commerce?" Or would you begin by trying to
determine who would have the right to vote for your new government?42
Would you begin by defining "executive" or would you spend most of the
summer determining who would elect the President?43Would you seek first to
define judicial power or worry more about how judges would be selected?44 To
any student of the Constitutional Convention, the answers to these questions are
obvious. Any quick survey of the debates from the Convention or the
ratification will reveal that, in fact, the founders did not spend most of their
time debating precise terminology; the debates were dominated by general
constitutive or structuralquestions. Indeed, notes of the debate and ratification
are pregnant with silences about the terms that so engage courts today. The
debates are filled, by contrast, with questions about rule by the few and the

42. See generally Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the
Making of the Constitution 60 (1996) (describing how "it was Madison's insistence on
solving the problem of representationfirst that set the course of debate").See also id. at 76
("Thuswhen a conciliating Gerrysuggested that 'it might be betterto proceed to enumerate
and define the powers to be vested in the Genl. Govt.' before deciding the rule of voting,
Madison repeated that such determinations had to await resolution of the rule of
representation.")(discussing debate of July 13, 1787). The question of whetherthe national
legislature would representthe states or the people occupied much of the early part of the
convention and, to avoid complete rupture, the large states eventually agreed to
"compromise,"leaving representationby the states in the Senate and representationby
population in the House. On this familiar story, see id. ch. 4 at 57-93. Compare 1 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 151 (Max Farranded., rev. ed. 1966)
(Madison's notes, June 7, 1787) (statementof James Wilson) (urging popularrepresentation
in both houses) [hereinafterFederal Convention], with 1 id. at 154 (Madison's notes, July
7, 1787) (statementof Roger Sherman)(moving to allow state legislaturesto elect Senators),
and 1 id. at 154-55 (Madison's notes) (statementsof ElbridgeGerry and CharlesPinckney)
(supportingelection by the state legislatures).
43. The question of how to elect the President was repeatedly addressed by the
convention. Indeed, up until the last month or so, the Presidentwas still to be elected by the
House of Representatives.See, e.g., 2 Federal Convention, supra note 42, at 29-36
(Madison's notes, July 17, 1787) (debating the election of the Presidentby the Congress).
Compare2 id. at 29 (Madison's notes, July 17, 1787) (reportingstatementsof proponents,
like Mr. Shermanof Connecticut,who thoughtthat "the sense of the Nation would be better
expressedby the Legislature,than by the people at large"),with 2 id. at 30 (Madison's notes,
July 17, 1787) (reportingstatementsof opponents,like Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania,that the
Presidentundersuch a system "wouldbe too dependent"on the House); see also 2 id. at 497
(Madison's notes, Sept. 4, 1787) (reportingthe Committeeof Eleven's resolutionsproposing
an electoralcollege-type alternative).
44. On judicial selection, see, for example, 1 Federal Convention, supra note 42, at
220, 232-33 (Madison's notes, June 13, 1787) (resuming debate on a resolution that had
struckout the provisions relatingto the jurisdictionof courts "in orderto leave full room for
their organization");id. (motion of Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Sherman to have the national
judiciary appointed by the "national legislature").But see 2 id. at 233 (statement of Mr.
Madison) (urging that the appointmentof the nationaljudiciary should be by the Senate); 2
id. at 40-44 (Madison's notes, July 18, 1787) (debating, without resolution, the "mode of
appointment"of the Judges and, whether it should be by the Executive or the Senate or a
combinationof the two).
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many,45 dependence and independence of political actors,46 and, inevitably,
representation.47Indeed, it seems fair to say that it was the conflict over the
45. See, e.g., Brutus, No. Ill, N.Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in Creating the
Constitution: A History in Documents 157, 159 (John P. Kaminski & RichardLeffler
eds., 1991) [hereinafterCreating the Constitution: Documents] (arguing against the
Constitutionthat "[i]t will literally be a governmentin the hands of the few to oppress and
plunder the many"); IX The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution: Ratification by the States: Virginia, Vol. 2, at 1113-14 (John P.
Kaminiski & GaspareJ. Saladino eds., 1993) (statementof James Monroe, June 10, 1788)
(arguingagainstthe proposedcomposition of Congress on the groundthat neitherthe Senate
nor the House would be "responsible"to the people); X The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra, at 1376
(statementof George Mason, June 18, 1788) (criticizingthe "marriage"of the Senate and the
President effected by the Constitution:"We know the advantage the few have over the
many. . . . They may join scheme and plot against the people without any chance of
detection.");An Officerof the Late ContinentalArmy,Phil. Indep. Gazeteer, Nov. 6, 1787,
reprintedin Creating the Constitution: Documents, supra, at 151 (arguing against the
Constitutionthat, "The most importantbranchesof the EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENTare to
be put into the handsof a single magistrate,who will be in fact an ELECTIVEKING.").But
see 1 Federal Convention, supra note 42, at 94 (Madison's notes, July 19, 1787)
(statement of Mr. Governeur Morris) (arguing for the Constitution that "[t]he Executive
thereforeought to be so constitutedas to be the greatprotectorof the Mass of the people").
46. On the importance of these concepts, see Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due
Foundation"for the Separationof Powers: The FederalistPapersas Political Narrative, 74
Tex L. Rev 447, 456-57, 460-63 (1996) [hereinafterNourse, Due Foundation]',see also 1
Federal Convention, supra note 42, at 59 (Pierce's notes, May 31, 1787) (statement of
Roger Sherman)(arguing that appointmentof Senators by the House and out of its ranks
"wouldmake [the Senators]too dependent,and therebydestroy the end for which the Senate
ought to be appointed")(emphasis added); 1 id. at 58-59 (Pierce's notes, May 31, 1787)
(statementof James Wilson) (arguing for popularelection of the Senate so as to insure its
independencefrom the national legislature) (emphasis added); 1 id. at 59 (Pierce's notes,
May 31, 1787) (statementof George Mason) (expressingthe opinion that drawingthe Senate
out of the first branch "would make the Members too dependent on the first branch,"in
addition to being impractical and "improper")(emphasis added). Dependence was an
importanttheme of the debate over a variety of other issues, from the method of paymentfor
governmentofficials to the mannerof their election. See, e.g., 1 id. at 215-16 (Madison's
notes, June 12, 1787) (statementof James Madison) (arguingthat payment of the members
of the national legislatureby the states would "createan improperdependence")(emphasis
added);2 id. at 292 (Madison's notes, Aug. 14, 1787) (statementof Daniel Carroll)(likening
a Congress paid by the State legislatures to a mere "second edition" of the Articles of
Confederation's federal legislature, in its "dependence] on ... the States") (emphasis
added); 1 id. at 175 (Madison's notes, June 9, 1787) (statementby James Madison)(arguing
that appointingthe Presidentby the legislaturewould lessen that independencewhich ought
to prevail" among the branches of government) (emphasis added); 1 id. at 68 (Madison's
notes, June 1, 1787) (statementof Roger Sherman)(favoring legislative appointmentof the
Presidentso as to make him "absolutelydependent"on the legislature)(emphasis added);2
id. at 102 (Madison's notes, July 24, 1787) (statementof Elbridge Gerry) (arguingthat the
President should serve for as many as 20 years to diminish his "dependence" on the
legislatureif elected by that body) (emphasis added);2 id. at 102 (Madison's notes, July 24,
1787) (statementof James Wilson) (agreeing to "almostany length of time" for presidential
tenure to eliminate the "dependence"that will result from appointmentby the legislature)
(emphasisadded).
47. Representationitself was much debated. CompareII The Documentary History

848

STANFORDLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 56:835

relation between the governed and their new federal government, as reflected in
the classic struggle over the relation between the states and the nation, that
served as one of the most significant factors in framing the Constitution's
horizontal as well as vertical structure, the separation of powers as well as
federalism.48
If we are to take seriously the original structure then we must understand
that the framers were creating a government, not interpreting it. The framers
did not come to the convention armed with dictionaries but, instead, with
political experience.49 They faced real dangers of political failure, popular
rebellion, and governmental impotence; they had to worry that their new
Constitution would be transformedin a sudden flash of violence, a rebellion, or
a coup- or, worse yet, a return to monarchical subjugation.50 Indeed, it was
of the Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification by the States: Pennsylvania
343-44 (John P. Kaminiski & GaspareJ. Saladino eds., 1993) (statementof James Wilson,
Nov. 24, 1787) ("[T]he world has left to America the glory and happiness of forming a
government where representationshall at once supply the basis and the cement of the
superstructure.For, representation,sir, is the true chain between the people and those to
whom they entrustthe administrationof the government. . ."), with BrutusNo. Ill, N.Y. J.,
Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in Creating the Constitution: Documents, supra note 45, at
157 ("The very term, representative,implies that the person or body chosen for this purpose,
should resemble those who appoint them ....
In this respect, the new Constitution is
radicallydefective.");id. at 159 ("[I]nreality, there will be no partof the people represented,
but the rich, even in that branchof the legislature,which is called the democratic"). Debates
about representationwere also debates about consolidation,one of the Antifederalists'major
objections to the Constitution. See, e.g., II The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution: Ratification by the States: Pennsylvania, supra,
at 425 (statement of Robert Whitehill, Nov. 30, 1787) ("I have said, and with increasing
confidence I repeat, that the proposed Constitution must eventually annihilate the
independentsovereignty of the several states. In answer to this, the forms of election for
supplyingthe offices of the federalhead have been recapitulated. . . .").
48. See, e.g., Harry Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding,in Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber, American Law and
the Constitutional Order: Historical Perspectives 85, 88 (1988 ed.) ("In a sense,
every succeeding decision of the convention flowed from this decision on representation.").
Even debates about the judiciary were carriedon in terms of the state/federalrelation and
popularcontrol. For example, in the Virginia ratificationdebates, George Mason arguedthat
Article III would "destroy"the states. X The Documentary History of the Ratification
of the Constitution: Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra note 45, at 1402
(statementof George Mason, June 19, 1788) ("Whenwe considerthe natureof these Courts,
we must conclude, that their effect and operation will be utterly to destroy the State
Governments.").James Madison respondedthat the judiciary's power was the least likely to
be abused because it would raise the "indignationof all the people of the States. I cannot
conceive that they [thejudges] would encounterthis odium."Id. at 1416 (June20, 1788).
49. See generally Rakove, supra note 42, at 29-31 (discussing the influence of the
political experience with state constitutions on the formation of the federal Constitution);
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at 467 (1998)
(arguing that the experience of politics in the states, which led one contemporaryto dub
them the "vile state governments,"was as importanta spur to reform of the Articles of
Confederationas was the weakness of the centralgovernment).
50. See X The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution:
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their experiences of state constitutional failures that were the "crucial lessons"
applied in their deliberations.51 It was those experiences, for example, that
foretold that "parchmentbarriers"were insufficient to protect the government
from dissolution into an excess of democracy or its opposite number,
aristocracy. Time and time again, the state constitutions had demonstrated the
weakness of lawyers' text when it came to the most cherished of structural
principles. Constitutions, like that in Virginia, had explicitly demanded that
each department remain "separate and distinct."52 And yet no matter how
insistently the word aimed to "structure"government, life disobeyed, yielding
routine failures and legislative corruption.53The only way to cabin power, in
Madison's view, was to understand its dynamics- to understand its incentives
and its risks in the hands of those who hold it.54The only way to counter power
was to make a self-executing system of competing relations and incentives.
This brief history, which I and others have told at greater length, should
give one pause about modern structural theory, but it should not send us into
despair. The standard questions about constitutional structure depend upon a
claim of authority based on a particular set of words drawn from constitutional
texts.55 Write them down, if you care to: "executive," "judicial," and

Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra note 45, at 1287 (statement of James
Madison, June 14, 1788) ("What is the situation of this country at this moment? Is it not
rapidly approachingto anarchy?Are not the bands of the Union so absolutely relaxed as
almost to amountto a dissolution?What has produceddespotism and tyrannyin other parts
of the world?").See generally Wood, supra note 49, at 464-65 (discussing the collapse of
Congressand political rebellion in the states as among the reasons for constitutionalreform).
See also id. at 466 ('The ability of America to sustain any sort of republicangovernment
seemed to be at issue.").
51. Rakove, supra note 42, at 30-3 1 ("By far the greatestinfluence that the experience
of the states exerted on the deliberationsof 1787 lay . ... in the area of constitutionaltheory
itself. For when the framers set about designing the new national government,the crucial
lessons they applied were drawn from their observation of the state constitutions written
since independence... By the mid-1780s ... all [the state constitutions]had come in for
careful scrutinyand mounting criticism as the experience of war and the dissatisfactionsof
peacetimegeneratedcomplaintsaboutthe shortcomingsof state government.").
52. See THEFederalist No. 48, at 335 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961)
(detailingthe Virginiaprovisionon the separationof powers).
53. See id. at 335-36 (borrowingJefferson's argumentthat a strict separationof powers
text had failed to provide for an adequateseparationof powers in practice and, indeed had
devolved into legislative tyranny,because the other departmentswere too dependentupon
the legislature). For a more extended argument on these essays, see Nourse, Due
Foundation,supra note 46, at 468-70.
54. The Federalist No. 51, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Jacob
Cooke ed., 1961) ("But the great security against a gradual concentrationof the several
powers in the same department,consists in giving to those who administereach department
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachmentsof the
others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteractambition.The interestof the man must be
connectedwith the constitutionalrights of the place.").
55. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the independent counsel was exercising "executive" power); I.N.S. v.
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"legislative"; add "commerce," "state," and "reserved," if you will.56 Now,
think of the absent and the future57- what one has for a government. There is
no room in this list for voting or elections or representation. Indeed, there is no
room for either the governed or the governing. And, as a result, if these words
are all there is to constitutional federalism and the separation of powers, then
the White House is empty, the Congressional chambers silent, and there are no
Justices. The same cannot be said of the constitutive provisions of the
Constitution- strike Article I, Section 2, and you have no House of
Representatives;58strike Article I, Section 3,59 and you have no Senate; strike
Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2 and 3,60 and you have no President. Strike all of
these, and Section 2 of Article II, and there is no one to nominate or confirm
anyone to the Supreme Court.61Indeed, there is no federal government at all
because one has severed the relation of the people to their government.
C. Shifting Power, Shifting Relations
The Constitution's constitutive texts link the people to their government in
vertical relation.62 The people vote, directly, for members of the House63 and

Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (seeking to assess whether the legislative veto was in fact
"legislative"action).
56. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 1 ("legislative");U.S. Const, art. II, § 1 ("executive");
U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1 ("judicial");U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("commerce");U.S.
Const, art. IV, § 4 ("State");U.S. Const, amend.X ("States"and "reservedto the States").
57. See Dewey, supra note 1, at 14 ("A thinking being can, accordingly, act on the
basis of the absent and the future.").
58. U.S. Const, art. I, § 2 (creatinga House of Representativeswhose membersare to
be elected by the people aggregatedby population).
59. U.S. Const, art. I, § 3 (creatinga Senate whose membersare to be elected by state
legislatures). This provision has, of course, been amended. The Senate is elected by the
people of the states, per the SeventeenthAmendment.U.S. Const, amend.XVII.
60. U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, cl. 2-3 (providing for the election of the President);see
also id. at amend. XII.
61. U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, provides that the President shall "nominate,and by and
with the Advice and Consentof the Senate, shall appoint. . . Judgesof the supremecourt."If
one eliminatesthe Senate and the President,of course, this provisionwould be inoperable.
62. There are, of course, a variety of complex social, cultural, and even economic
factors that go into making these relations"live." One cannot, for example, have a working
representativerelationwithout the people having a basic sense of trust in their government.
See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes,
Consequences and Reform 26 (1999) (stating that pervasive corruptionunderminesthe
legitimacy of government);Amy Chua, Markets,Democracy & Ethnicity: Towarda New
Paradigmfor Law and Development, 108 Yale L.J. 1, 56 (1998) (noting, in the context of
developing democracies, how "too much corruptioneffectively can subvert the political
process, replacing democracy with kleptocracy").These factors, however important,do not
underminethe claim I make here that relationsof representation,in the thin sense of the term
"relation,"constitutegovernment.
63.

The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State
legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the
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the Senate; they vote and, through the Electoral College, elect a President and,
in far more attenuated fashion, they authorize the Senate and the President to
choose Supreme Court justices.64 These are central constitutional "doings" or
"practices"; they are acts that create relations between the people and their
federal government.65 Those relations- between citizens and the federal
government- affect the relations between state citizens and their state
governments. We fought a civil war to establish the simple proposition that no
one may be deprived, by a state, of national citizenship.66 We also know that
the federal Constitution "guarantees"a relationship between the states and the
people, a relationship characterized as "republican."67Finally, we know that
there are intersections of these intrafederal and federal-state relationships: that
citizens, organized in states ratherthan a nation, elect the House and the Senate,
and that this feature of the Congress, as an institution, makes it relatively more
likely (than the executive) to respond to locally aggregated constituencies and
to find its political fortunes tied to those of state political officials.68
The vertical relations created by the Constitution, invite us to ask very
present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland,derives its appointmentindirectly from the
people. The Presidentis indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the
example in most of the States. Even the judges with all other offices of the Union, will, as in
the several States, be the choice, thougha remotechoice, of the people themselves.

The Federalist No. 39, at 252 (JamesMadison)(Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
64. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 2 (creating a House of Representativeswith members to
be elected by the people aggregatedby population);U.S. Const, art. I, § 3 (creatinga Senate
with members to be elected, now, by the people of the states); U.S. Const, amend. XVII
(providingfor the electoral process for Senators);U.S. Const, art. II, § 1 (providing for the
election of the Presidentby the nation throughan electoral college); U.S. Const, art. II, § 2
(providing for the appointmentof members of the SupremeCourt by the nationally elected
Presidentand confirmationby the state-population-electedSenate).
65. Amar, supra note 12, at 35 (emphasizing the constitutive aspects of the document).
See John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 33-34
(1969), for a discussion of the difference between constitutive and regulative rules:
[R]egulative rules regulate antecedently or independentlyexisting forms of behavior; for
example, many rules of etiquette regulate inter-personal relationships which exist
independentlyof the rules. But constitutiverules do not merely regulate,they create or define
new forms of behavior. The rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate
playing football or chess, but as it were they create the very possibility of playing such
games.

66. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1 ("All persons born or naturalizedin the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
whereinthey reside.").
67. U.S. Const, art. IV, § 4 ('The United States shall guaranteeto every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion. . . .").
68. On the responsivenessof membersof Congressto more local constituencies,see R.
Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action 7 (1990) ("[W]hen legislators
have to make a decision they first ask which alternativecontributesmore to their chances for
reelection..."). For some of the political links between members of Congress and state
officials, see Kramer, Understanding,supra note 25, at 1523-29 (arguing that political
parties create "relationships"and establish "obligations among officials that cut across
governmentplanes"and thus tie local to federalofficials).
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different questions of power than do traditional theories of federalism and the
separation of powers. They invite us to ask- not how power is described in the
Constitution (as, for example, "judicial," "executive," or "state")but, insteadhow changing power shifts constitutional relations between the governed and
the governing. Let me emphasize, however, the limited reach of this claim. My
argument is not that we should jettison functional categories as such; they are
often useful shorthand. (Indeed, to the extent I am asked to put myself within
the traditional academic camps on structural questions, I identify myself as a
functionalist- where that is defined as giving "reasons,"ratherthan raw labels,
to explain structural decisions.) My claim is that the notion of a "function" is
often a poor proxy and that no constitutional anatomy can be complete without
understandingthat structuralideals like federalism and the separation of powers
do more than protect the linguistic integrity of the functions described in the
vesting clauses- they also protect the people and their relation to government.
This "constitutive approach" may sound abstract, but it is grounded in
uncontroversial intuitions about constitutional power. For example, let us
imagine that some oddball proposed shifting the war power from the Congress
to the Supreme Court. If we are worried about such a decision, we are worried
not because of the definition of power at issue- we do not go running to a
dictionary, for example, to investigate the meaning of "war" nor do we sit
pondering the question of the "function" of war. We are worried, instead,
because of the political relations that govern its decision: We are worried that
the Court will go to war without the people. A similar analysis applies to
federalism decisions. Assume that our oddball proposes to shift the power to
declare war to the states. Again, our worries are unlikely to be resolved by
struggling over the meaning of the war power or whether the militia is a
"traditionalstate function." We worry not because of definitions or descriptions
but because, when the planes are in the air, we wonder whether the states could
agree to go to war at all.
And, lest this example seem outlandish and academic, consider the similar
effects of a more modest and plausible case- for example, if Congress were to
give to the federal courts the power to nominate inferior officers in the
Executive Department.69 The Constitution specifically provides that the
Congress may grant the power to appoint "inferior officers" not only to the
"heads of departments"(where it is normally lodged) but also to the "courts of
law."70Would not then the relations and dynamics of the federal executive, not
to mention the federal judiciary, change substantially, if to obtain a position
working for the Energy Department or the Army, one had to be appointed by a
judge? Certainly, the judiciary would have far greater power over the

69. Special thanksto JerryMashawfor suggesting this example.
70. U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointmentof such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courtsof Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
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administration of law, indeed over the entire federal government, if it could
appoint a significant portion of those people who worked for the President
(arguably far more power than that under the judiciary's Article HI review of
administrative cases). Who would the "courts of law" appoint, after all, as an
assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as an inferior officer in the Department
of Health and Human Services? Former judges, prominent lawyers, friends of
the judiciary? Surely, incentives and relations, rather than the "function" of
appointment, explains why Congress rarely grants judges the power to appoint
lesser officers in the executive branch.
It is one thing to say that shifting power amounts to shifting political
relations between the governed and the governing. It is another to determine the
kind of risks entailed in such shifts. Indeed, one of the great problems of the
doctrines of separated powers and federalism has been the dispute about their
aims. Are these doctrines aimed at protecting individuals?71Are they aimed at
protecting "traditional"allocations of authority?72Are they aimed at protecting
some other "value" such as balance or impartiality or unity or efficiency?73
Each of these aims seems to me to have some plausibility but each fails to
provide much of a predictive tool for measuring structuralrisk.
My approach eschews a search for the "values" of our constitutional
structure; it considers, instead, constitutional structure as a dynamic process
channelling political voice, in an interplay that seeks only to avoid the perils of
a form of government in which the voices of the many are too strong or the
voices of the few are too weak. It seems to me that we can all agree that a
government in which the few rule is a form of aristocracy and that a
government in which the many oppress the few yields a form of tyranny; we
can also agree that both of these imagined ends pose grave risks to a republican
form of government.74 These were, after all, the fears with which the Framers
wrestled. These are the risks to which we should today attend. They are not
risks encompassed in descriptive failures (in whether this is really "commerce"
or really "economic" or really "executive") but in relations between the people
and their government.75

71. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 27 (arguing that the separationof powers serves to
protectindividualliberty).
72. See, e.g., MartinH. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, If Angels Were to Govern: The
Needfor PragmaticFormalismin Separationof Powers Theory,41 DUKEL.J. 449 (1991).
73. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 421, 433-37 (1987) (listing various values sought to be promotedby the separationof
powers, including limited government, containmentof factions, and reducing conflicts of
interest); see also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317 (1997)
(discussing variousvalues of federalism).
74. Note that I never use the term "democracy"in this paperbecause the term is simply
full of normativeconfusions. On this idea, see Dan M. Kahan,Democracy Schmemocracy,
20 CardozoL. Rev. 795 (1999).
75. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed.,
1961):
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The texts describing vertical relations are important for what they do as
much as what they mean, for the incentives they generate as much as the
precise dictionary definitions they invoke. From changes in these relations and
incentives (from shifts between representational ties to the people) we may
make a set of pragmatic inferences: inferences that aim to predict the stakes of
shifting governmental decisionmakers, where the stakes involve real life
majorities and minorities. We must ask whether any particular structural
innovation risks serious changes in our form of government, where by "form,"I
mean representationalform as a republic. What is an aristocracy, after all, but a
government in which the few rule the many; what is the tyranny of the mob but
a government in which the many oppress the few? Put in other words, for any
particular structural innovation, we must identify the baseline relations that
govern, how those relations change with the proposal, and what the new
relations and incentives mean for risks to majorities and minorities.
This approach, however contrary to traditional views of constitutional
structure (in particular the judiciocentric view), finds substantial support in
more general understandings of constitutional politics, understandings ancient
and modern. One can find concern for risks to majorities and minorities not
only in a modern day article on institutional economics, but also in Madison's
infamous tenth essay of The Federalist. The first risk, and the one most easily
seen in the context of constitutional law generally, is the risk that a majority
poses to a minority.76 Madison and the founding generation more generally
were quite concerned with majorities that acted as a "faction," (where a
majority faction is a group united by a common interest or passion committing
unjust violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals, so
that they may further their own majoritarian interests). Today, we tend to be
familiar with this risk in constitutional law because of its emphasis in the
"rights" area, where the work of John Hart Ely has had its most pronounced
influence.77 The second risk runs in just the opposite direction- the possibility
that minorities will oppress majorities, that the few will oppress the many.78

[W]e may define a republic to be ... a government which derives all its powers directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people .... It is essential to such a government that it
be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a
favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a
delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their
government the honorable title of republic.

76. As James Madison put it: "Complaints are every where heard. . . that our
governmentsare too unstable. . . and that measures are too often decided not according to
the rules of justice and the rightsof the minorparty,but by the superiorforce of an interested
and overbearingmajority."The Federalist No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke
ed., 1961); see also id. at 60-61 ("When a majority is included in a faction, the form of
populargovernment. . . enables it to sacrifice to its rulingpassion or interestboth the public
good and the rights of othercitizens.").
77. See Ely, supra note 3, at 73-104 (emphasizing the ways in which majoritiesmay
"tyrannize"minorities).
78. "By a faction I understanda numberof citizens, whether amountingto a majority
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The Founders were acutely aware of this risk because this was the risk they
associated with "aristocracy."79Today, public choice scholarship has made
clear how small, highly concentrated minorities may wield power
disproportionate to the voting strength of their members. By virtue of the
relative ease of organization, and lower transaction costs, small groups may in
fact come to dominate large, relatively more dispersed, majorities.80 If these
risks are generalized, they become more than risks, but changes in the "form"
of government- rule by the "few" or the "mob."81
If this is right, then the question in structuralcontroversies- whether they
be controversies about federalism or separated powers- should be the same.
The question should be whether the proposed structural innovation yields

or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community." The Federalist No. 10, at 57 (James Madison)
(JacobCooke ed., 1961) (emphasisadded).
79. See, e.g., Brutus, No. Ill, N.Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in Creating the
Constitution: Documents, supra note 45, at 159 (arguing against the Constitutionthat
"[i]t will literally be a government in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the
many"); IX The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution:
Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra note 45, at 1376 (statementof Mr. Mason)
(criticizing the "marriage"of the Senate and the Presidenteffected by the constitution:"We
know the advantagethat the few have over the many. . . . They may scheme and plot against
the people without any chance of detection."). On the role of aristocracyin debates over
constitutionalprovisions, see Wood, supra note 49, at 484-85 ("Both the proponentsand
opponents of the Constitution focused throughout the debates on an essential point of
political sociology that ultimately must be used to distinguish a Federalist from an
Antifederalist.The quarrelwas fundamentallyone between aristocracyand democracy.");id.
at 488 ("Nothingwas more characteristicof Antifederalistthinkingthan this obsession with
aristocracy.").
80. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The
Theory of Group 5-64 (1971) (emphasizing the power of small groups: "[t]he greater
effectiveness of relatively small groups- the "privileged"and "intermediate"groups- is
evident from observation and experience as well as from theory . . . .") This greater
effectiveness is a power which correspondsto the risk of the "few," as I am using that term
here. James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 112 (1962) (discussing the various
decisionmakingcosts of organizing groups, and the detrimentaleffect of the costs on the
construction of a majority in a larger group). For recent work casting doubt on the
universality of the Olson principle that small groups are always more effective, see Joan
Esteban & Debraj Ray, Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox, 95 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 662,663-72(2001).
81. I rely heavily here on the institutional economics of Neil Komesar who has
developed a two-force model of politics. See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives:
Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, ch. 3 ( 1994) (describing
the two-force model of politics, which depends upon risks both to majoritiesand minorities).
This model refuses to view government as always or never virtuous, but considers the far
more moderateand plausible claim that sometimes governmentsdo, and sometimes they do
not, reflect majoritywill. This moderationobviously flies in the face of both the extreme
pessimism of public choice scholarship and the extreme optimism of the pluralist or
deliberativedemocracymodels.
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substantial increased risks to majorities and minorities. This view finds support
not only in historical, but also modern understandings of politics. A focus on
incentive and institutional relation is the stuff of positive political theory and
institutional economics. Neither an economic theory of the Constitution and its
institutional structure, nor one focused on the positive political effects of
institutions, can ignore the incentives created by the document. By focusing on
the relations between the governed and governing, I am trying to put
institutional incentives at center stage- for it is those incentives from which we
may make predictions of future structuralrisk.82
If this is right, it is right because, at least in part, it challenges what law has
assumed to be the nature of power (as a set of generic activity descriptions) and
suggests that there is something more to be considered. The idea that I am
pursuing here is that courts' traditional vision of power as activity-description
is incomplete; that the constitutional text itself tells us that the power created by
the document inheres in something more than activity or function.83 The
document itself tells us that the power it creates is not only a set of words but
also a set of practiced relations between the governed and the governing. These
constitutive relations (typically referred to as representation) should be more
importantto contemporary structuraltheory if for no other reason than that they
live- every time someone votes, every time a person criticizes his or her
congressman, every time a man or woman pickets the White House.84
In what follows then, we will imagine power built not from dictionaries,
but from the people. We will imagine that the doctrines of separated powers
and federalism aim not only to describe our government but also to constitute
relations between the people and their government. From this vantage point,
when we look at questions of structuralinnovation our focus shifts from what is
being done to who is doing it (where the "who" is a relation between the
governed and the governing). If we move a decision from Congress to the
Court we have not only moved an activity, we have moved a decisionmaker (a
decisionmaker whose incentives are governed by a particular relation to the
people). For example, a shift from Congress to the Supreme Court means that a
decision once governed by the representation of locally aggregated
constituencies (states and districts) will now be governed by no constituency at

82. For furtherdiscussion of the relevance of political economy to this model, see infra
PartIV.B.
83. For a demonstrationof this, see supra notes 56-62 and accompanyingtext.
84. I believe CharlesBlack relied upon this notion of relationat least as much as on the
more general notion of structure. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and
Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969). This notion of relation is ratheran ancient
idea. See, e.g., Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 7 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn
Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds., CambridgeUniv. Press 1989) (1748) (describing the
laws of "political right" as those governing the "relation between those who govern and
those who are governed," and the notion of "civil right" as between the governed
themselves).
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all. This, in turn, raises particularkinds of risks, risks to majorities which may,
in turn, create risks to our form of government. We do not want the Supreme
Court ordering the Marines to deploy because we fear that the Court will go to
war without the support or will of the people. And we do not want the Court to
go to war without the consent of the people because this risks changing our
form of government- toward rule by the judicial few.
In actual cases, of course, the relational calculus may be far more complex.
This story will require that we keep simultaneous hold of risks that might
otherwise appear conflicting (risks we conventionally conflate by using terms
like "politics" and the "rule of law").85 If, for example, we were to move tort
litigation from the courts to Congress, we would not worry that majorities were
being ill represented, rather,we would worry that minorities and/or individuals'
rights were at risk. More importantly, however, both risks might arise in any
particular case. This is particularly true in any case in which an activity is
shifted from the President to Congress or from Congress to the President.
Indeed, it will become clear that this is the source of much confusion generated
by the traditional approach where the issue is a conflict between the President
and Congress.
In what follows, I consider some of the more controversial structural
decisions of the past. Although the cases are well-worn territory,the analysis is
not. Indeed, it is precisely because the cases are well-worn, that I believe we
can best see the relative advantages of an unfamiliar recourse to the constitutive
relations created by the constitutional text.
II. Separation of Powers
I begin with a classic separation of powers "category" problem. My aim is
to show how and why a constitutive view of the Constitution may help to
relieve the pressures of categorical homogeneity implicit in conventional
judiciocentric approaches. This brings me to consider the interplay between the
separation of powers and what I will call "implied federalism," a first step in
elaborating the intersections of horizontal and vertical constitutional structure.
A. Categorical Conflict and Embedded Relations
INS v. Chadhase is one of the chestnuts of separation of powers law, a case

85. The "rule of law" is an ancient concept which harborsrathercontrarymeanings.
On the one hand it is invoked as a reason for the law to restrainmajorities;on the otherhand,
it is invoked as a reason to defer to majorities. In such a case, the "rule of law" poses the
problem, it does not answer it. On the rule of law generally, see Paul W. Kahn, The Reign
of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America 10 (1997) (noting that
the SupremeCourt's claim to act in the name of the rule of law "does not reflect a fact; it
states an ambition,a point from which it will enter a contest of political meaning").
86. 462 U.S. 919(1983).
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as famous for its overruling of hundreds of statutes as for its obvious
categorical riddles. The Court's opinions striking down the legislative veto
yielded no less than three very different categorical descriptions of the
legislative veto. For Chief Justice Burger, the veto was obviously legislative.
For Justice Powell, it was adjudicative. And for Justice White, who rejected the
majority and concurring opinions as wildly formalistic, the veto was simply
another conditional delegation of power to the executive branch to exercise
"quasilegislative" powers.87
As if this were not enough, the majority opinion seemed to adopt a
definition of "legislative" power that was overly broad at best and potentially
destructive at worst. The holding of the case was that the legislative veto
violated the Constitution's Bicameralism and Presentment Clause. To reach
that conclusion, the majority believed that it had to categorize the veto as
"legislative" in character.88But, in making that categorical determination, the
Court invoked a definition that was highly problematic, finding that any action
that "had the purpose and effect of altering legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons," was legislative in nature.89That definition almost immediately raised
questions: questions about whether courts (which decide "legal rights")
somehow violate the bicameralism clause, and, more importantly, whether
administrative agencies that "legislate" rules and regulations without
bicameralism are unconstitutional.90Exacerbating the problem, the Court tried
to ameliorate such conflicts by suggesting that the decision to deport Chadha
was "legislative" in character when exercised by Congress and yet was
"executive" in nature when exercised by the Justice Department.91 Not
surprisingly, commentators tended to be mystified by Chadha and its
categories.92 The continued invocation of these categorical dilemmas is

87. See id. at 952 (Burger, J.) (characterizingthe legislative veto as "essentially
legislative in purposeand effect"); id. at 960, 964 (Powell, J., concurring)(characterizingthe
legislative veto in Chadha as prima facie "adjudicatory"action); id. at 986, 989 (White, J.,
dissenting) (characterizingthe legislative veto as a retained legislative check on a grant of
quasilegislativepower to an executive agency, similar to Congress' broadpower to delegate
legislative authorityto executive agencies).
88. "Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of
legislative power depends not on their form but upon 'whetherthey contain matterwhich is
properlyto be regardedas legislative in its characterand effect.'" Id. at 952 (quoting S. Rep.
No. 54-1335, at 8 (1897)).
89. Id.
90. Congress' lawyers argued that if the veto was legislative in character,then the
Attorney General's initial action was also legislative, raising constitutionalquestions about
whether administrativeagency action was constitutionally possible without violating the
Bicameralismand PresentmentClauses. See id. at 952 n.16.
91. See id. (acknowledgingthat "some administrativeagency action- rulemaking,for
example, may resemble 'lawmaking,' ... but that when the Attorney Generalperformshis
duties pursuantto § 244, he does not exercise 'legislative' power," and therefore is not
requiredto satisfy the bicameralismrequirement)(internalcitationsomitted).
92. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,Jr. & John Ferejohn,TheArticle I, Section 7 Game,
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evidence of what Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn have called Chadha's
"wooden formalism."93
Looking at the case as one about shifting relations, as opposed to one about
texts, may help to illuminate the constitutive risks of the legislative veto. But to
get there, one must understand a few things about the functional categories
themselves. The categories of adjudication, legislation, and execution tend
toward the essentialist; they imply a descriptive homogeneity that we know to
be false in fact. It is a staple of the literatureon constitutional structurethat all
of the departments can be found "functioning" in ways that look like the
appropriate functions of other departments.94What is often missed in this is
that the Constitution's own text, for example, provides evidence contrary to
functional discreteness (and indeed this was known to Madison and the
founding generation).95For example, the "legislative" power may be vested in
the Congress but the Senate's powers clearly include "adjudicative" activity
(Senate impeachment trials) and "executive" activity (confirming
appointments).96 Most importantly, the "executive" power is vested in a
President but the President is granted "legislative" power (the "veto").97 Since
there is no unique functional/activity description enumeratedby the text itself it
should be no surprise that attempts to apply such a descriptive approach should
fail- both in a textual and a realist sense.

80 Geo. L.J. 523, 523-26 (1992) (noting a variety of inconsistencies between Chadha and
otherdecisions dependingupon a definitionof "lawmaking").
93. See id. at 527 ("Chadhaassumes a wooden and unnecessarilyformalist operation
of bicameralismand presentment,as simply hoops that bills mustjump throughbefore they
become law.").
94. See Peter Strauss,Comment:Was ThereA Baby in the Bathwater?A Commenton
the SupremeCourt'sLegislative VetoDecision, 1983 Duke L.J. 789.
95. The President's veto power appears in Article I (the article vesting "legislative"
power), not Article II (the articlevesting "executive"power). It was feared, for example, that
the veto power would allow the Presidentto "legislate";similarly, there was worry that the
appointmentand treaty powers of the Senate, when joined with the powers of the President,
made the departmentsless than "separateand distinct."See, e.g., The Federalist No. 47, at
328 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that state constitutions blended
powers and using as an example of blended or mixed power the executive veto); The
Federalist No. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (defending the
"qualified connection" between the Senate and the President in appointmentsand treaty
The Debate Over the
making); see also 1 Federalists and Antifederalists:
Ratification of the Constitution 68 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989)
("The combination of the Senate and President in appointments and treaty-makingwas
denounced[by the Antifederalists]as a violation of the principleof separationof powers.").
96. U.S. Const, art. I, § 3 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.");U.S. Const, art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providingthe Senate's "adviceand consent"
power in the articleon "executive"power).
97. See U.S. Const, art. I, §§ 1,7 (vesting "legislative power" and providing for the
executive's veto: "Everybill . . . shall, before it become a Law, be presentedto the President
of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall . . . proceed to
reconsiderit.").
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Accounts of constitutional structure that depend upon governmental
function not only generate a bad descriptive account of the Constitution, they
also fail to predict what we know to be real shifts in power. I can easily
perform an intellectual experiment in which I hold function constant but can
make mincemeat of the balance of power of our current form of government.
Just have the House elect the Senate and see what happens to the Presidency;
the departments are still "doing" the same things and performing the same
"functions," but the "balance" of power changes dramatically. With a Senate
beholden to House members, we have a far more unified legislative body and
thus a far greater threat to the President.98 Function alone cannot predict
significant changes in constitutional structure. Perhaps more importantly,
functional labels are not only descriptively impoverished but also are often
normatively confused. For example, sometimes, when we call something
"adjudication," we mean "good, that is what a court should do to restrain
majorities"; but sometimes when we call something "adjudication,"we mean
precisely the opposite, "good, that is what a court should do to legitimate or
defer to majorities." Thus, it is possible that when we say that something is
"adjudication," we are already implicitly defining what that "function is" by
reference to an unacknowledged offstage, and potentially conflicting,
moralization.
If we move beyond the question of functional activity toward vertical
relation and constituency, we tend to reduce potential descriptive conflicts for
no other reason than that electoral methods are not fungible across the
departments. Congressmen are elected in particular ways and those ways are
not repeated in the selection of the President or members of the Supreme Court.
At the same time, however, this approach adds considerable flexibility in our
accounts because it permits us to see the possibility that the functional/activity
categories are really crude proxies for different and even conflicting
governance risks. Put in other words, once one gives up on the
categorical/descriptive ideal, it is possible to see that there are very different
risks to the people posed by the legislative veto in Chada.
Let us begin with the easiest risk to see: the risk to popular majorities. Had
Congress sought to deport Chadha on its own, it would have had to pass a bill
through the House, the Senate, and have it signed by the President. In Chadha,
the Supreme Court's majority repeated this fact over and over again but did
little to explain how this related to the meaning of bicameralism." From a

98. For a more complete analysis of this, see Nourse, VerticalSeparation,supra note
37, at 761-63.
99. "The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal
Governmentinto three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial,to assure, as
nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned
responsibility."INS v. Chadha,462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see also id. at 944 ("[T]he fact
that a given law or procedureis efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitatingfunctions of
government,standingalone, will not save it if it is contraryto the Constitution.").
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vertical perspective, however, there is more to bicameralism than meets the
eye, particularly if one cares about the relations between the people and their
government. Imagine a law providing that only Arizona would, in the future,
decide budgetary questions for the nation. Our concern about such a proposal is
not about function: The reasons that we think such proposals are
unconstitutional has very little to do with whether the members from Arizona
are legislating or executing or adjudicating. We fear such a proposal because
there is a distinct risk to popular majorities'. Would we really want nationally
important decisions to be made only by a few states or districts? What better
way to create an elective aristocracy?
It is no answer to this to say that, in Chadha, there was full representation
because there was a vote by the entire House of Representatives. A one-house
veto may cover the nation geographically but still presents risks of partial
constitutional representation, because the Constitution demands the agreement
of two different forms of constituency, one reflected in the Senate and the other
in the House.100 Decisions by the House alone, and thus by population alone,
will tend to reflect the majoritarianpreferences of the larger population centers;
by contrast, a decision by the Senate alone will tend to prefer the smaller states.
As a general rule, then, congressional action requires bicameralism not for
some reason-without-reason but because of vertical, representational
concerns- that congressional decisions should be representationally redundant
(that they satisfy the majoritarian preferences of both larger and smaller
aggregations of voters).101 Some may question whether that mix of interests
favors the few,102 but it is unquestionably a representative structure that the
bicameralism requirementseeks to enforce.
This understandingdoes a betterjob not only of giving popular meaning to

100. Although wrapped in the rhetoric of function, the majority opinion does in fact
referto this representationalhistory:
[T]he Framers were also concerned, although not of one mind, over the apprehensions of the
smaller states. Those states feared a commonality of interest among the larger states would
work to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the other hand, were
skeptical of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the people. ... It need
hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise, under which one House was viewed as
representing the people and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the large and small
states. We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral
requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions.

Id. at 950-51 (citationsomitted).
101. "The Framersadmiredthe legitimacy of popularrepublicandecisionmaking,but
rejected systems of lawmaking by simple majority votes, either in the form of direct
democracyor of a unicameralparliamentarysystem ... ." Eskridge & Ferejohn,supra note
92, at 528. The point was to retard "factional" legislation at the same time as creating
multiple sites for the reflectionof majoritariansentiment.
102. It is widely known that the structure of the Senate allows a minority of the
population (in some cases a very small minority), to veto legislation. See Lynn Baker &
Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone, 13 J.L. & POL. 21

(1997). The Senate's structure and internal rules require, in effect, a significant
supermajoritybefore any piece of legislation even reachesthe desk of the President.
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the Chadha Court's apparent formalistic reliance on the bicameralism clause,
but also limits the Court's rationale in ways that the categorical model does
not.103 To say that Congress needs to act with the full complement of the
people's representatives (state and local, House and Senate) says absolutely
nothing about what distinguishes legislation from execution in some abstract
dictionary sense. As a result, such a determination does not require any agency
or department,other than Congress, to satisfy bicameralism requirements. (One
wonders, of course, how an administrative agency could ever satisfy such a
requirement: Would it have to convene "two houses" of the agency?).
Similarly, the focus on the vertical relation tends to alleviate any apparent
inconsistency between the decision to deport Chadha as "legislative" in
Congress but "executive" when determined by the Justice Department. One
need not characterize the decision to deport as legislative or executive, to
conclude that, when Congress acts, it must act in ways that are consistent with
the representationaldemands of the Constitution.
B. Change, Baselines, and Relative Shifts in Power
Now consider Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Chada: He concludes
that the legislative veto was neither legislative nor executive, but, instead,
adjudicative.104 From the perspective of the typical "matching game" story,
this seems to be quite incompatible with the majority's views.105 A function
that is legislative one moment cannot suddenly be transformed into a function
that is adjudicative the next. If I am right, however, there may be nothing
inconsistent in the Burger and Powell opinions: Both may simply raise different
risks to the people.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion assumes that the category "legislation" is a
proxy for a feared risk to majorities (a fear of "partial representation"of the
whole); for Justice Powell, the category "adjudication"serves as a proxy for a
different fear- a risk to the few. As a general rule, Congress may not and does
not decide individual cases, as Justice Powell noted. There are good reasons for
this; the fear is that such a power, in the hands of a representative body, poses

103. If, after Chadha, all "lawmaking" must be subject to the bicameralism
requirement,then questions arise whether, for example, Congress' delegation of lawmaking
authorityto the ComptrollerGeneralviolated the bicameralismrequirementin Bowsher. For
this and otherquestionsbased on Chadha's equationof "lawmaking"with bicameralism,see
generally Eskridge& Ferejohn,supra note 92, at 524-26; id. at 526 ("Chadha'sconceptual
frameworkis in tension with the results or the reasoning of the Court's practice in other
areas: it is strikingly inconsistent with Dames & Moore; arguablyinconsistentwith Alaska
Airlines, Mistretta, Chevron, and the Court's frequentendorsementsof legislative history;
and suggests a differentanalysis thanthat followed by the Courtin Bowsher.").
104. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958 n.22 ("Justice Powell's position is that the oneHouse veto in this case is &judicial act ... .").
105. See id. (rejectingthis view: "[T]he attemptedanalogy betweenjudicial action and
the one-House veto is less thanperfect.").
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grave risks to individuals and minorities.106A Congress that adjudicates will be
a Congress that protects favorites and punishes scapegoats. Chadha, who the
Justice Department had ruled should stay, had been handpicked out of
hundreds107to have his case reversed by the head of a subcommittee whose
judgment appeared to have been rubberstamped.108 Justice Powell was
concerned lest the decision represent the kind of unfairness that the
Constitution aims specifically to prevent through the Bill of Attainder clausetrial by legislature.109
Viewed in this light, the Powell and Burger opinions do not conflict, even
if their descriptive, functional, judgments do. The reason is that the risks to
representation implicit in the functional judgments are quite different (indeed,
they are the opposite risks). This is due, in large part, to the fact that the
opinions conceive of the shift in constitutive relations quite differently. The
majority opinion appeared to worry about a shift from a full Congress to a
partial Congress- and thus struck the statute down based on a shift of political
power from the many to the few. Justice Powell's concurring opinion saw the
case differently, as a shift from a relatively insulated executive branch
employee (or even a judge) to members of Congress. The risk was not to
majorities but to minorities. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger thus do not
see the same risk, but both do see significant constitutional risks from the
legislative veto, one for Chadha, the other for the rest of us.

106. See id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring)("In deciding whether Chadhadeserves to
be deported,Congressis not subjectto any internalconstraintsthatpreventit from arbitrarily
deprivinghim of the rightto remainin this country.Unlike the judiciary or an administrative
agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the
proceduralsafeguards,such as the rightto counsel and a hearingbefore an impartialtribunal,
that are presentwhen a courtor an agency adjudicatesindividualrights.").
107. "In addition to the report on Chadha, Congress had before it the names of 339
other persons whose deportationsalso had been suspended by the Service." Id. at 964.
(Powell, J., concurring).
108. According to Justice Powell, the "normalprocedures"for consideringresolutions
were not complied with in Chadha's case. Id. at 964 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).In the case
of Chadha's bill, the simple resolution "was not distributed prior to the vote, but the
Chairmanof the JudiciarySubcommitteeon Immigration. . . explained . . . [that] it was the
feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained in the
resolutiondid not meet the statutoryrequirements,particularlyas it relates to hardship
Id. at 964 (Powell, J., concurring).The majority's opinion notes that in a prior veto bill,
RepresentativeEilberg appearedto make the claim that he had "worked"with the Attorney
General's office on the "vetoes,"thus suggesting to the members present that the veto was
not controversial.See id. at 927 n.3.
109. As Justice Powell explained:
[The Framers'] concern that a legislature should not be able unilaterally to impose a
substantialdeprivationon one person was expressed not only in this general allocation of
power, but also in more specific provisions, such as the Bill of AttainderClause, Art. I, § 9,
cl. 3. As the Court recognized in United States v. Brown . . . "the Bill of AttainderClause
was intended. . . [as] a general safeguardagainst legislative exercise of the judicial function,
or more simply- trialby legislature."

Id. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring)(internalcitationsomitted).
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Viewing Chadain this way highlightsthe possibilitythatthe problemwith
Chadhais not thatthe categoriesconflictbut thatthe risksare overdetermined:
thatthereis morethanone risk fromthe legislativeveto. This can only be seen,
however,if one focuses attentionon changeratherthanstasis, shiftsin relations
ratherthanessentialistfunctions.It is this aspectof the relationalanalysisthat
differs fromthe traditional"matchinggame"we know as categoricalanalysis.
Focusing on shifting stakes to the people reveals that which categorical
"baseline"quite
analysesseek to hide- it makesthe questionof the appropriate
explicitand realistic.Whatwe shouldwantto know in structuralcases is what
effect structuralinnovationswill have on the people- whetherour government
will veer too far towarda rule of aristocratsor tyrants.To focus on changeand
shiftingpoweris to makeexplicitone's startingpoint in a way thatcategorical
analysesseem to defy or at least obscure.The "matchinggame"offers a static,
essentialistinquiry,the activity always "is" or "is not" some "function."A
constitutiveanalysismediatesthis essentialismnot only by shiftingto a notion
of risk (which does not "locate" a power in any geographic space or
bureaucraticessence), but also asks about the dynamicmovementsof power
"from"and"to."
The Burger and Powell opinions perceived different risks, one to
majorities,the otherto minorities.This reflects decidedlydifferent"baseline"
judgments.Justice Powell viewed as the appropriatebaseline the decision of
individual cases by independentdecisionmakers;110
Chief Justice Burger
viewed the baselineas a full-dressCongress.111
Relativeto the decisionof the
full Congress and the President,the decision by RepresentativeEilberg's
subcommitteeto deportChadhawas less likely to reflectmajoritarian
concerns;
but relativeto a decision by a court or independentdecisionmaker,that very
same decision was more likely to increase majoritarianinfluence to the
detrimentof individuals.Thereis, in the end, a commonsense to this. To put it
simply, RepresentativeEilberg was more than a judge but less than the
Congress. He was a politicized decisionmaker,not an independentone,
decidingthe fate of an individual;andyet, at the same time, his districthad no
right to speak for the nation, for Congressand for the President.It is in this
sense that the risks to majoritiesand minoritiesidentifiedby Chief Justice
Burgerand JusticePowell may both exist, even if the categoricalproxies for
thosejudgmentsappearto contradicteach other.

110. See, e.g., id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Unlike the judiciary or an
administrativeagency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it
subject to the proceduralsafeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an
impartialtribunal.").
111. See, e.g., id. at 958 ("To accomplish what has been attemptedby one House of
Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the
Constitution'sprescriptionfor legislative action; passage by a majorityof both Houses and
presentmentto the President.").
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C. ImpliedFederalismand the Separationof Powers
There will be those who will find this story incompleteor unacceptable
becauseit offendsa ratherconventionalaccountof Chadha- one which rejects
the Court's opinion as both formalisticand unpalatable.The debate about
Chadhahas been and continuesto be focusedon whetherCongressshoulduse
the legislative veto to "control"broad delegations of lawmakingpower to
administrativeagencies. In this vein, the legislative veto has been seen as a
or "fresh"checkon runawayagencies.112
"workable"
All of this, however, tends to begin from the baseline presumption
embeddedin the notion of "lawmaking."The argument'sassumptionis that
"lawmaking"authorityis somehowimproperlyin the handsof the agency and
thereforethe proper,accountableauthority(Congress)needs to be put back "in
charge."To say, at the start,that one is moving "lawmaking"authorityto the
agencies is to run the risk of begging the question (that one means by
"lawmaking"actually"congressionallawmaking").After all, as JerryMashaw
has pointedout, the Presidentis an elected official too- and when Congress
grants power to agencies, it does not send its missives into space or to
judges;113it sends them to the President,an official responsiveto an electoral
audience, albeit one that is differently constitutedthan the congressional
electorate.All of this simply supportsthe view that I have been taking- that
the shift of decisionmakerto administrativeagencies is not the transferof a
particularkindof power(lawmakingor executiveor adjudicative)but, instead,
is a shift of relationsto the public.To see more clearlyhow this model works
and what it reveals about the conventionalstory of Chadha, let us turn to

112. The term "fresh check" hails from Professor Stephen Carter. See, e.g., Carter,
supra note 24, at 746. For a powerful game-theoreticargumentthatthe legislative veto may
be a wise use of congressional power to check administrativeagencies, see Eskridge &
Ferejohn,supra note 92, at 540-43. One must note that the "fresh check" theory, however
elegantly expressed,and whetherimportantin the context of agency decisionmaking,has not
appearedso attractiveoutside of this context. It is the growing consensus, for example, that
"fresh checks," like the IndependentCounsel and the Sentencing Commission, may raise
ratherserious constitutionalquestions.
113. "If this descriptionof voting in nationalelections is reasonablyplausible, then the
utilizationof vague delegations to administrativeagencies takes on significance as a device
for facilitating responsiveness to voter preferences expressed in presidential elections."
Jerry Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve
Public Law 152 (1997) (emphasis added). As Mashaw argues, delegation may actually
"improv[e]the responsivenessof governmentto the desires of the general electorate."Id. at
153. Moreover,Mashawadds:
If congressional statutes were truly specific with respect to the actions that administrators
were to take, presidentialpolitics would be a mere beauty contest. . . . [S]pecific statutes
would mean that presidents and administrationscould respond to voter preferences only if
they were able to convince the legislature to make specific changes in the existing set of
specific statutes. Arguments for specific statutory provisions constraining administrative
discretionmay thereforereflect a desire merely for conservative,not responsive, governance.

Id
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Justice White's dissent, in which the "fresh check" claim seems to find its
naturalhome.
We have already seen Chief Justice Burger's focus on the shift from a full
Congress to a partial Congress and Justice Powell's focus on a shift from an
independent decisionmaker to a politicized one. There is as well another shift
that must be considered. For Justice White, the important shift was not at the
time Congress decided Chadha's fate but, rather, when it reserved part of the
delegated power from Congress to the Executive to decide immigration
matters. It is this temporal framing of the case to which I now turn so that we
may see how many separation of powers cases carry a dimension of what I will
call (for lack of a better term) "implied federalism." (Later, we will see the
more obvious incarnation of "implied" separation of powers concerns in
federalism cases.) It is here that the case takes a turn away from the nature of
the legislative veto, toward the President's veto.
In considering power shifts from Congress to the President and vice versa,
it seems obvious but is worth remembering that the representationalor vertical
structure of the American legislature and the American presidency are not the
same. As noted above, standardkinds of structuralanalyses tend to plunk both
departments in the "politics" camp without recognizing the different incentives
and structures in these institutions.114Indeed, anyone who watches television
on the night of Presidential elections is likely to know that the way in which
votes are aggregated geographically matters not only to outcomes but to the
incentives of the particular players. The Congress and the President both
represent national majorities, but they represent them differently- and that is
because members of Congress represent more fragmented and localized
constituencies.115
One way in which the Congress and the President represent the nation
differently is that members of Congress speak to a much smaller constituency.
Senators speak to state-aggregated constituencies, and House members speak to
district-aggregated constituencies. It is this dimension that serves as a principal
difference between the representative institutions of our federal government.
The President does not represent the Third District of Connecticut or the state
of Alaska; he represents the nation, just as it is also true that the Senator from
Oklahoma does not represent the nation. This yields an "implied" federalism
component to the separation of powers because any shift from the Congress to
the President or vice versa is likely to involve a relative shift away or to state
and locally aggregated electorates (albeit at the national level).

114. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 3, at ch.l (referringto the differentconstituenciesof
the Presidentand the Congressbut emphasizingthe court's similarrole with respectto each);
David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the
People Through Delegation (1993).
115. A 51% majority may lead to a Presidentialpolicy, for example, that will never
pass Congressbecause of the geographicalconcentrationof the 51% of the population.
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This "implied federalism" dimension of national structure is, of course,
well known in federalism scholarship116and was well known, indeed crucial, to
the adoption of the Constitution;117here, however, we consider it in a rather
different place- the separation of powers. Lest there be confusion, my claim is
not the traditional Wechslerian position that the Court need not review
federalism cases because the states are in fact represented in the Congress.118I
am interested, here, in something different; I am interested in the separation of
powers, the entire constitutional structure, where that structure is conceived of
as separate forms of popular representation. In a sense, then, I am simply
beginning with a truism: Members of Congress are elected in a different way
from the President. And that way is distinguished by one body's reliance upon
more local electorates. As Charles Black once put it, the member from the Fifth
of Texas lives and breathes based on what they think of him in the Fifth of
Texas.119Add that up 535 times and one gets 535 states and localities; and that
is the "implied federalism" dimension of the separation of powers.
The actual representational picture is, of course, more complex120 and
116. See, e.g., Weschler,supra note 25.
117. Rakove, supra note 42, ch. 4 (discussing the ways in which questions of
representation influenced the structure of the Congress, the Presidency, and their
relationship).
118. Briefly, here is my position on the Wechsler thesis: First, and foremost, I reject
the notion that we can best determinequestions of structureby looking at them initially as
questions of "judicial review"- there is more at stake in this than the decisionmaking of
courts. As for the Wechsler thesis, itself, however, I have stated before that I believe the
Wechsler argument is unpersuasive in its given form but may ultimately have some
resonance.Like LarryKramer,I believe that there are importantways in which the electoral
structure of the Senate does in fact link national and local politicians. See Kramer,
Understanding,supra note 25, at 1523-29 (emphasizing the role of political parties in
forming ties across planes of government).National politicians need votes in localities and
so they find organizations that are capable of mobilizing those votes (whether those
organizationsare churches or unions or local party officials). As the political economists
have told us, small groups are often betterat catalyzinga majoritythan a broad-basedappeal
to the majority.The most notable difference between my position and the currentcontenders
is my claim that state governmentsare to be protectedunderthe constitutionas a proxy for
the interestsof the people of the state; there is no independentconstitutionalinterestin any
particular form of state bureaucracy, other than the minimal condition that it be a
"republican"form of government and the more substantive condition that it not violate
federal constitutional guarantees. This does not mean that the federal government can
interferewith the form of state governmentsat will; it means quite the opposite, namely, that
the federal government should resist strongly any intervention in the form of state
governmentsprecisely because the choice of state structurereflects the deep structureof the
people's wishes for self-governance.
119. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political
Departments,1 Hastings CONST.L.Q. 13, 16-17 (1974).
120. I referhere to changes in the election of Senatorsand to the fact that congressional
districtsare not constitutionallymandated.Neither of these complications,however, changes
the relativecalculus in the text. Even if all House memberswere elected by state-widevotes,
and the Senate had no allegiance to state governments(as opposed to state voters), it would
still be the case that the Congress would be at a relative advantagein reflecting the interests
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subject to all of the regularly identified political pathologies. As I have said
before, separation of powers doctrine cannot cure the government of all
political pathologies, only particular structural pathologies.121 If the member
from the Fifth forsakes his constituents, there is nothing that the separation of
powers can do to rectify those failures. What constitutional structuremay do is
identify risks separate and apart from the standard agency risks. Thus, even if
we were to assume the most gloomy view of electoral politics produced in the
past twenty years, in which politicians regularly forsake majorities for
minorities, it would still be the case that we should worry about the separation
of powers- not because it could cure agency problems or eliminate special
interests- but because it regulates relations between political institutions.122
Regarding shifts from Congress to the President, and vice versa, the question
remains whether a shift from a nationally aggregated constituency to a more
locally aggregated one (and again vice versa) raises significant risks to our
form of government. But to assess that we cannot begin assuming that because
the President and the Congress are political entities, they somehow have the
same representational incentives. As a general rule, the President has a more
national focus and members of Congress a more local one.
There will be those who will insist that this presumption does not always
hold; the skeptic will note that, in any particularcase, for example, our member
from the Fifth may actually take a "national"position or the President may take
a position that favors some states over others. Of course that is true. But a
presumption is a presumption (rather than a rule) because its truth is subject to
rebuttal. I am aiming to capture, not all of the incentives of any particularactor
in the system, but a simple and thus predictive take on relative incentives, with
emphasis on the term "relative." The point is not to reinvent the essentialist
question in the elective nature of the Presidency or the Congress but, instead, to
determine their relative structuralincentives. And as a relative matter, it seems
fair to conclude that the President has greater incentives to speak to the nation
than the member from the Fifth of Texas. As Professor Mashaw tells us: "The
President has no particular constituency to which he or she has special
responsibility to deliver benefits .... [I]ssues of national scope and the
candidates' positions on those issues are the essence of presidential
policies."123
of more local electorates than would the President.This holds true, moreover, even though
there are links between the President and the states that are periodically forged by the
demands of the electoral college since such links are far weaker than those between the
"memberfrom the Fifth" and the electorate of the Fifth, in part because of the difference
between a two-year and a four-yearelection cycle and in partbecause of the contingency of
voter distributions.
121. Nourse, VerticalSeparation,supra note 37, at 786-87.
122. Of course, if one thinks that all political decisions are always and inevitably
corruptor bought,just as if one thought they were all wise and pluralistic,there would be
little to argue about.
123. Mashaw, supra note 113, at 152.
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If, as I have detailed, we view the departments as representing different
constituencies, then it seems fair to conclude than any shift to Congress shifts
decisions from an audience that is nationally dispersed to one whose wishes are
more locally aggregated. Shifting in the opposite direction (taking a task or
decision away from Congress and giving it to the President) raises precisely the
opposite risk: reducing the relative power of state and locally aggregated
constituencies. Put more colloquially, the question posed is whether the
President and his "men" will be as responsive to local concerns as would be the
Senate or the House or their combination (or whether the Senate and House
will be as responsive to national majorities as is the President).
In Chadha, both of these "implied federalism" risks were present at
different points in the legislative process and this is what, in the end, separates
the majority opinions from the dissent. Justice White, in his dissent,
emphasized "time one," when the original immigration statute was passed,
including the legislative veto. At that time, the relevant shift was from Congress
to the executive (shifting decisionmaking power away from locally aggregated
constituencies) to decide individual deportation matters.124As Justice White
makes clear, at time one, the statute's problems are similar to any other
delegation of authority to the executive.125 And, on this question, he is certainly
correct. The problem is that this does not answer the question at time twowhen the legislative veto is exercised.126 At that time, the relevant shift is in
124. The obvious implication of this is that "delegation" cases reflect "implied
federalism"concerns, as I have defined them here. There is a common sense to this: One of
the conventionalcomplaintsabout the delegation of broadpowers to the federalgovernment
is the claim that broad delegation takes power away from the states. Delegation doctrine,
however, is generallynot viewed as a federalismissue.
125. If Congress may delegate lawmakingpower to independentand executive agencies, it
is most difficult to understandArticle I as forbiddingCongress from also reserving a check
on legislative power for itself. Absent the veto, the agencies receiving delegations of
legislative or quasi-legislativepower may issue regulationshaving the force of law without
bicameral approval and without the President's signature. It is thus not apparentwhy the
reservationof a veto over the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more
exacting text. In both cases, it is enough that the initial statutoryauthorizationscomply with
the Article I requirements.

INS v. Chadha,462 U.S. 919, 986-87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasisadded).
126. Justice White argues, for example, that the legislative veto does not underminethe
separationof powers because it requiresthe agreementof all three departments:"[Section]
244(c) (2) did not alter the division of actual authority between Congress and the
Executive. . . . [A] permanentchange in a deportablealien's status could be accomplished
only with the agreement of the Attorney General, the House, and the Senate." Id. at 994
(White, J., dissenting). In fact, the Attorney General did not agree to Chadha's deportation
and had the case ended with his decision, it would not have led to Chadha's deportation
while, because the decision ended with the Congress, he was to be deported. White's
argumentbased on "agreement"conflates the order in which the parties are to decide the
matter.This is achieved in partby assuminga baseline of deportabilityand reconstitutingthe
AttorneyGeneral's decision as a "proposalfor legislation,"and the Congress' decision as a
failure to act on that proposal. See id. at 997. This act/omission framing issue does not
change the ultimate order of decisionmakingwhich still (even if Congress is construed as
"failing to act") ends with Congress. That gives priorityin the individualdecision to deport
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precisely the opposite direction (shifting power from a nationally aggregated
audience to a locally aggregated constituency).127 And that question involves
more than delegation- indeed, it involves more than the Congress; it becomes
one of the President's power to veto.
If Congress had passed a traditional piece of legislation to deport Chadha,
the President would have had the opportunity to veto it. But, with the
legislative veto, at "time two," the President can do nothing. The skeptic will
reply that the President already had his opportunity because his agent, the
Department of Justice, had previously acted. But that inverts the traditional,
temporal order of action under the Constitution. And temporality is relevant
where the separation of powers is concerned, because it matters to popular
representation. The Constitution is structured so that a national audience
typically has the last say on a piece of legislation (subject to an override by a
congressional supermajority). That structure has an impact on the relative
power of constituencies. Just imagine that we eliminated the President's veto
and you will see that this would shift significant power to the states and
localities. (After all, it was one of the Anti-Federalists' objections during the
ratification debates, that the President's veto would shift power to the nation
and away from the states).128 From this perspective, the legislative veto is
problematic because it shifts the "last say" away from the President and his
national constituencies, toward the Congress and its state and locally
aggregated audiences (without a supermajority). It is no answer to this to say,
as Justice White did, that, at "time one," in the original passage of the Act, that
the President acquiesced in such an arrangement.We would hardly say that the
President and the Congress could agree anticipatorily to give away the veto, in
part or in whole.
The importantpoint is not whether you are convinced by this argument that
the Chadha statute must be judged at "time two." The important point for my
purposes is to show how and why the question in Chadha comes down to one
of "implied federalism." If one judges the case at "time one," when the original
immigration statute was passed, then there is no question that the action
appears like any other delegation; but if one judges it at "time two," then there
is a significant question about whether state and locally aggregated
constituencies have gotten "anotherbite at the apple" (one that they would not
get typically unless they could gather a supermajority to override the
President).

to relatively more local constituenciesand thus still risks parochialism.
127. For example, returnto our example of a Constitutionwithout a presidentialveto.
It seems fairly easy to predictthat if the Congresswere to have the final word on legislation,
such a system would increase the relative power of those whom Congress represents(state
and local interests)relativeto the power of the president'snationalconstituency.See Nourse,
VerticalSeparation,supra note 37, at 765-66.
128. See id. at 765 & n.57 (providing citations for sources documenting the AntiFederalistperspectiveduringthe debates).
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Many self-styled "liberals" have tended to find little troubling in the
legislative veto and have excoriated the Supreme Court for applying a
formalistic analysis. Yet, often times, it is these same "liberals" who worry
about federalism; they view devolution to the states with some skepticism,
skepticism inspired by the fear that state majorities will oppress minorities.
Those two positions are inconsistent: If you worry about federalism (meant as
devolution to the states), you should also worry about the legislative veto. And
you should worry about it for the reasons that were so apparentin the case: that
bodies aggregated by relatively more local constituencies- states and
districts- are likely to be relatively more parochial than nations. Surely, this is
what realism tells us about Representative Eilberg's decision to deport Mr.
Chadha. Would you really want your personal claim to citizenship to depend
upon the whims of a single congressional representative?
III. Federalism
So far, I have tried to show that the idea of function serves as a proxy,
albeit a crude one in structural matters. Even though we might essentialize a
government innovation as legislative, or judicial, or executive, we have seen
that these characterizationsmay not in fact contradict each other. Indeed, they
may reflect consistent judgments, albeit judgments not about function or
activity but about risks to the decisionmaking relations between the people and
their government. Here, I extend this analysis to more recent structural
problems, problems typically denominated as questions of federalism. Just as in
the separation of powers context, the relevant activity descriptions (the "local"
and the "national")serve, in my view, as proxies for judgments about the kinds
of electorates that we want to decide matters of institutional structure.Thus, the
"truly local" and the "truly national"129will be considered as different relations
between citizens and their governments.
The federalism debates begin, today, with the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lopez.130 Prior to Lopez, it was thought that the commerce
power was virtually without limit.131 Congress could reach seemingly local
activities if, by aggregating those local activities, there was a significant effect
on interstate commerce.132 In Lopez, however, the Court held that the
aggregation principle only applied to "economic" or "commercial" activities.133

129. I am referringhere to the terms used most recently by the SupremeCourt in one
of its more controversialfederalismdecisions. See United States v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598,
617(2000).
130. 514 U.S. 549(1995).
131. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 685 (1995)
("Before Lopez many academics and lower court judges speculated that the Commerce
Clause no longer imposed any limits on congressionalaction.").
132. See, e.g., Wickardv. Filburn,317 U.S. 111 (1942).
133. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (interpretingprior cases, such as Wickard,as "upholding
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The Court thus struck down Congress' attempt to regulate the "possession" of
weapons within a certain radius of a school zone on the ground that this was a
matter of crime, not commerce.134
Lopez's solution to the problem of congressional aggrandizement- the
embrace of a new category of "economic" or "commercial" activities- has
already led to predictable descriptive difficulties.135 Like the traditional state
function test before it, the Lopez standard leads to framing issues. If the
"commercial" function test is applied at the most narrow, fact-bound level, then
the growing of wheat in Wickardwas not economic (planting and growing do
not depend upon a national economy), nor the eating of food at Ollie's
barbecue,136nor sleeping at Atlanta Motel,131nor even perhaps the sawing of a
Of course, in these cases, the court opened the
piece of wood in Darby.
"subject frame,"139asking whether planting or dining or sleeping led to an
economic effect- overhanging the market or restraining travel. But, might not
the frame be widened "just a bit" in Lopez, wide enough to encompass the
defendant's intended sale of the gun?140As commentators have noted, subject

regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate,substantiallyaffects interstatecommerce").
134. Id. ("Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,however broadly one might define those
terms.")(internalcitationsomitted).
135. For an incisive critique of the categorical approach, see Judith Resnik,
Categorical Federalism:Jurisdiction,Genderand the Globe, 111 Yale L.J. 619, 621 (2001)
("[C]ategorical federalism ought to be understood as a political claim, advancing an
argument that certain forms of human interactions should be governed by a particular
locality, be it a nation-state or its subdivisions ....
Categorical federalism's attempt to
buffer the states from the nation, and this nation from the globe, is faulty as a method and
wrong as an aspiration.").For an amusing yet insightful one, see John CopelandNagle, The
CommerceClause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-LovingFly, 97 MlCH.L. Rev. 174 (1998)
(discussing problems of aggregation and similarity of activities in the context of an
endangeredspecies act question).
136. Katzenbachv. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause to enact Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a
restaurant).
137. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to enact Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as appliedto a hotel).
138. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber
manufacturedby a Georgia companywhich paid its employees less than a minimumwage or
requiredworking more than a maximumof hoursprescribedby law).
139. I borrowthe notion of framingfrom MarkKelmanand his idea of "time-framing."
See Mark Kelman, InterpretiveConstructionin the SubstantiveCriminalLaw, 33 Stan. L.
Rev. 591 (1981).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (describing Lopez's testimony that he broughtthe gun to school so that he
could deliver it after school to one "'Jason,' who planned to use it in a 'gang war,'" for
which Lopez would receive "$40 for his services").
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framing may well cause problems in cases far afield from Morrison and Lopez
- in cases of debt repayment and child pornography and the protection of
endangered species.141
However persuasive this critique, it is an ancient one, one that repeats the
cautionary tale of the New Deal and of National League of Cities- a tale
typically told as one about the vanities of categorical pretension. Nothing in the
critique, however, addresses the animating fears of those attracted to the
categories. At various points in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
predicted that, unless courts define the constitutional term "commerce," the
states will suffer dire consequences and even be "obliterated."142Of course,
this is a deeply exaggerated position; as far as I last checked, the states did not
disappear after the New Deal. Moreover, a single gun statute, however
overbroad, is unlikely to change that. Yet, like many fears, this one is
particularly revealing. Given that the states have in fact shown a certain
robustness in the face of this judicial fear, even in periods when the Supreme
Court has failed to exercise review,143 one must consider the possibility that by
"constitutional" limits, the court really means not "constitutional" limits but
"judicial" limits- limits that courts (as opposed to a different institutional
entity) may enforce. Opponents of the categorical view have often asserted that
questions of federalism are best left to the political process. The idea,
associated first with Herbert Wechsler, is that Congress and the President
reflect the interests of the states, including state sovereignty. This view suffers
from a variety of defects but it does hint at the possibility that there is
something more involved here than the definition of what is truly "local" or
"national." It hints at the idea we have been considering- the consequences to
the people of shifting a decision from state to nation, or nation to state.
A. Lopez: Risfa to Majorities
Federalism implicates two different relations between constituents and

141. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 135, at 634-38; id. at 634 ("In Morrison's wake, the
category of 'the economic' has taken on a vitality that opens up challenges to many federal
statutes. . . .").
142. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77 (1936) (predicting that if the
Courtwere to accept New Deal argumentsin favor of the AgriculturalAdjustmentAct that
"the independence of the individual states [would be] obliterated, and the United States
converted into a central governmentexercising uncontrolledpolice power in every state of
the Union, superseding all local control or regulation of the affairs or concerns of the
states.") (emphasis added). Presumably,if members of Congress really did not care about
state populations, then we would have seen greater challenges from the legislative
departmentbefore the second centuryof our government'shistory.
143. See, e.g., Bednaret al., supra note 40, at 255 ("But it seems to us that Amencan
federal practices have been enormouslyrobust in the face of massive changes in the nature
of the society and the economy. The states and localities are still vibrant sources of policy
determination.. . .").
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their government. We are citizens of both state and nation. Although today we
take this dual set of relations for granted, in 1787, the application of the federal
government to individuals was considered one of the principal innovations of
the Constitutional Convention. The "great vice" of the confederation was its
operation on the states in their "corporateor collective" capacities.144The great
remedy was to "extend the authority of the union to the persons of the
citizens,- the only proper objects of government."145Then, a rather simple
assumption was made about this dual relation: that the people would have a
closer relationship to their state governments than to the federal. This was
considered, by the Federalists at least, a simple matter of geography and
acquaintance. Repeatedly, proponents of the Constitution insisted on the
closeness of the people to their state governments relative to the federal:
Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people
of each State would be apt to feel a stronger byass [sic] towards their local
governments than towards the government of the Union.146

Today, of course, we are tempted to complete this passage and conclude
that the loyalties that lie with a state may easily stray when the nation does a
better job of governing. We recognize, at one level at least, that national power
has grown with crisis, war, and recovery. We know, as well, that technological
revolutions in communications and transportationhave made us a different, and
closer, nation. And, yet, there is a kernel of truth that remains to the proposition
that the state governments are, at least relatively, closer to the people than is the
federal government. Just ask yourself whether you would want your child's
school assignment or your own parking permit issued from Washington and
you will see that localism still lives and matters in people's lives (and this
despite, and perhaps even because of, the communications revolution). My
point is not that geography matters so much as that geography is often a crude
surrogate for a sense of control and agency in citizenship.
Localism matters because of the simple pressure that numbers seem to pose
for our relationship to our government: With fewer numbers, we have a greater
sense of control over our local government.147This sense is mirrored in what
we know about numbers and the transaction costs of governing. As a general
rule, it is easier for a majority to be constructed in a town than a city, a state
than in a nation (even if there may be exceptions to that rule). Notice that this
result does not arise from the essence or presumed "nature" or "value" of
locality or even from strong notions of either sovereignty or geography.
Instead, it arises from the effect of numbers on the transaction costs of

144. The Federalist No. 15, at 93 (AlexanderHamilton)(JacobCooke ed., 1961).
145. Id. at 95.
146. The Federalist No. 17, at 107 (AlexanderHamilton)(JacobCooke ed., 1961).
147. There are other reasons, of course, including a political culture that has always
prizeddecentralization.
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governing, an effect that in turn finds itself expressed as the common sense
"closeness" of individuals to smaller ratherthan larger governments.
From this rather simple starting point of size, we may reconceive the
question in modern federalism cases not as a question of descriptive categories
but, rather, as a question about the shift from the citizen's relation to their
federal government to their state government. When we transfer the power to
decide- about guns or schools or violence - from the state (with its smaller
constituencies) to the nation (with its larger constituencies), political incentives
shift. A decisionmaker representing more people is less likely, relative to one
who represents fewer people, to be sensitive to citizen preference. Indeed, as a
variety of modern scholarship in political science and economics has shown, a
disaggregated system is far more sensitive to citizen preference than a
completely unified, national system.148 Of course, this sensitivity to majorities
is presumptive; it may not hold in any individual case. Most importantly, it is a
relative risk. Both state and nation may betray the people's wishes in any
particular case (the so-called "agency" risks always persist). But if we are
worried about predicting structuralrisk, then it seems uncontroversial to begin,
at least, with a presumption that a relatively more disaggregated set of citizens
is more likely, on average, to reflect more sensitive accounts of majoritarian
preference.149Indeed, it seems to me that this addresses in a straightforward
manner some of the "anxieties" of federalism that are ratherpoorly and cheaply
dressed as geography.150
148. See GordonTullock, Federalism:Problems of Scale, 6 Pub. Choice 19, 21 (1969)
("[T]he smaller the governmentalunit the more influence any one of its citizens may expect
to exert, consequently,the smaller the unit, the closer it will come to fitting the preference
patternsof its citizens.");see also, e.g., Eskridge,Bednar& Ferejohn,supra note 40, at 22629 (marshallingnormativeand positive argumentsfor the propositionthat "[a] decentralized
polity will usually end up with fewer dissatisfied citizens"); Oliver E. Williamson,
Hierarchical Controland OptimumFirm Size, 75 J. Pol. ECON.123, 123-38 (1967) (arguing
that there are diminishing returns to scale in almost all organizations; the larger the
organization,the greater the loss of control over subordinates,which increases the cost of
organization).
claims
149. One might well argue at this point that there are conflicting "majoritarian"
here- the federal majoritythat createdthe statuteand the majorityof a state or collective of
states that may disagree. That is true. It still remains the case, however, in deciding what
power Congress has vis-a-vis the states, that the states are closer to the people than is the
national government. This closer connection is, of course, relative and presumptive;the
states may, in fact, be acting quite unlike a majorityand ratherlike a "minority."That the
analysis may well be, in reality, quite complex, does not however underminethe general
notions outlinedhere as presumptions.
150. JudithResnik has arguedquite persuasively in her Categorical Federalism piece
that geographyhas been placed in the service of the gender status quo. Resnik, supra note
135, at 630-34, 643-54. I agree wholeheartedlywith Professor Resnik that geography may
mask normativeclaims. The difference between my argumentand ProfessorResnik's is that
I focus on a story about the people's relation to their government.There is a persistence to
the federalismanxiety and that persistence, I believe, suggests a concern about the people's
connection/relation/control
over a growing federal(and indeed global) government.The fear
is, at least in part, that all connection to governmentwill be lost in the "indifference"of a
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Localism may provide benefits, but it also creates obvious costs and a
simple comparison makes this quite clear. If it is true that smaller
constituencies are likely to be more sensitive to majoritarianpreferences, it is
also true that they are more likely to be oppressive.151If it is easier to gather a
majority in a town hall than in a nation, it is also easier to gather a lynch mob in
a town than in a nation. For every benefit obtained by a more local decision,
there is a corresponding increase in risk- to minorities. If this is true, and we
will see it as true in the next case, we cannot confidently end the analysis in
praise of localism. We must worry, as Madison once did, about risks both to
majorities and minorities.152This is where dynamism enters the picture; this is
where a dualist theory of political risk is revealed as embedded in federalism's
idea of function, just as we saw it embedded in the separation of powers' idea
of function. But let us return to the initial position, and see how it works itself
out in real cases.153
Applying this framework to Lopez yields some interesting results,
suggesting that Lopez was a rather easy (if perhaps trivial) case. This is not
because such a law would violate a "categorical" rule about crime, nor even
because it would mean an "end of the states," or even because it might coerce
the large states for the benefit of the small.154 It is because one should worry
about federalism if one cares about majoritarianism. But the worry must be
articulated correctly- it is not to a set of values or traditions or descriptions, to
accountability155or even state sovereignty- and it is not unalloyed.156 It is a

distant bureaucracy.Put anotherway, I believe that these anxieties are ones we might call
anxieties of voice, that is, fear that, in all this globalizing and nationalizing,the people will
have lost a place where theirvoice counts. It is this thatpromptsme to embracethe notion of
federalismas a questionof majoritarianwill.
151. Komesar, supra note 81, at 81-82 (discussing the costs of majoritarianbiases and
their ability to generate"atrocities"against minorities,and their more pervasive characterin
local decisionmaking,such as local decisions about land use).
152. The Federalist No. 10 (JamesMadison).
153. I am not urging, nor do I believe, that every congressionaldecision affecting the
states raises a risk to majorities. Moreover, as I try to articulatelater, this is only the first
level of analysis- in some cases, we must ask whetherthe states' claim to majoritarianismis
really an attemptto thwartcitizens' relationto their nationalgovernment.
154. On the persistence of the importanceof state government,see Bednar, Eskridge,
& Ferejohn,supra note 40, at 225, 255.
155. On the differences between questions of accountabilityand representation,see
Jane S. Schacter, Accountingfor Accountability in Dynamic StatutoryInterpretationand
Statutory
Interpretation
(2002), available at
Beyond, in Dynamic
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art5
156. The SupremeCourthas increasinglyrelied upon the notion of "accountability"to
resist or modify congressional claims. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922,
929-30 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). Accountabilityis a difficult concept
and one that differs from representation.It implies an actual effort to "call one to account"
that resists the kind of thin, presumptiveanalysis I have suggested here. To eliminate, as
much as possible, the "off-stage" moralizationsequated with accountability(that someone
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risk to popular representation, more specifically to the representationalrelation
between citizens and their state government (a relation assumed and relied
upon in the constitutive texts).
One reason that Lopez seemed to raise little concern in many minds was
precisely because state majorities appeared not to be substantively at risk:
Many states had the very same no-guns-outside-schools policy, so it seemed
that the interests of state majorities were not put at risk by a similar federal
policy. Of course, the mere existence of state laws on the topic does not
eliminate the possibility of a risk to state majorities. Parallelism in general
policy does not warn us of the different ways in which states could choose to
enforce the particularpolicy - whether by way of penalties or by way of actual
application of the statute. Imagine a federal government that aimed to repeat all
state criminal laws but with higher penalties, and one will easily see that such
differences could have serious majoritarianeffects. Thus, although it should not
be overemphasized, even seemingly parallel policies may still raise risks to
state majorities.
Risks do not end the analysis, however. For, in the end, almost all
constitutional risks may be undertaken for a decent enough reason. And, here,
the case pretty much decides itself. However serious the risk to majorities in
such a case (and relative to many cases, it seems it was fairly minor), Lopez
was effectively decided by the fact that Congress had asserted absolutely no
contemporaneous justification for running it.157 Of course, the government
offered a plausible post hoc connection between the statute and commerce; but
that is not the question asked by an analysis based on popular representation.
The risk of failing the "categories" is a dictionary risk, a risk for the coherency
of law perhaps, but not the real world. The risk I am talking about lives and
votes; it is a risk to the people of the states that their preferences will, in a
momentary burst of national political vanity, be disregarded. To respond to
such a claim, one cannot simply stamp one's foot and announce "commerce."
Lopez in this sense was a rather simple case: Because of the way that the
statute was initially passed- as a last minute technical amendment to a large
omnibus crime bill158- there was no rationale offered to explain the need for
has done something "improper"for which he or she must be called to account), I have
and even better"relation,"which tend to have relatively
preferredthe terms "representation"
greaterresistanceto such off-stage moralizations.
157. As the Court put it, "the Governmentconcedes that 'neither the statute nor its
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon
interstatecommerce of gun possession in a school zone.'" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (quoting
Brief of the United States at 5-6). Similarly, the Court rejected the post hoc attempt of
Congressto add findings in a later Congress on the question of interstatecommerce. See id.
at 563 n.4.
158. In the Senate, the Gun-FreeSchool Zones Act was passed as a last minute set of
amendmentsthat were added en masse to a major crime bill. See Omnibus Crime Bill, S.
1970, 101st Cong. § 39 (1990); see also Biden/ManagersAmend. No. 2104, of which the
Gun-Free School Zones Act is a part, and which begins with a variety of amendments
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federal, as opposed to state, intervention.159This in turn reflected the Court's
fears that the statute was simply a way to gain political favor in an election year
without any consideration of the constitutional questions at issue. There was
nothing in the record of Congress' nondeliberation160 to suggest

deemed "technical"and "conforming."S. 1970, 101st Cong. § 39 (1990). Like many other
amendmentsin that package, it was an "easy"political call in the Senate: Since many states
had the same legislation, it was likely Senators would not consider the proposal
controversial.When I have asserted this in public, some scholars have expressed concern
that federalism surely must have been a concern for some Senators because the 1000 feet
mark might have made densely populated areas, like New York City, into one continuous
"gun-free" zone. However true that interpretationmay be as a post hoc lawyer's reading of
the statute,the argumentmisunderstandsthe Senate's political dynamics and incentives. The
Senate's political structure strongly favors rural areas, rendering this argument largely
irrelevantto those who are the ultimate decisionmakers.Moreover,even the Senatorfrom a
state that includes a large city, like New York, not only has a large urbanarea to represent,
but a ruralarea as well. In the ruralarea,this kind of policy might sell very well outweighing
whatever concerns there were about the city or, as in real life, it may simply mirrorthe
wishes of many city-dwellers for more, ratherthan less, gun control. Having been on the
floor of the Senate at the time, as counsel to the managerof the bill, I can say that there was
no concern expressedto me by any Senatoror staff member,Republicanor Democrat,about
federalismissues relatedto the Gun-FreeSchool Zones Act. Overbreadth,in crime politics,
is hardly ever regardedas a political sin and is rarely the basis of political objection. See
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505
(2001).
159. One cannot generalize, as a matter of fact, that Congress always or never
considers the interestsof the states or the people of the states. Sometimes, as in Lopez, time
and political pressure align in ways that make it very unlikely that the impact of federal
legislation on the states or state majoritieswill be considered. On legislative pressuresthat
lead to ambiguity or lack of attention, see Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The
Politics of LegislativeDrafting:A Congressional Case Study,77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (2002).
In other cases, however, federalism concerns may be openly debated. During roughly the
same time period that the Congress considered the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it also
considered a proposal to "federalize"almost all gun crimes, known then as the "D'Amato
amendment."See Amendment No. 387 to S. 1241, the Violence Crime Control Act, 137
Cong. Rec. S8846 (1991). The proposal initially passed the Senate handily, despite
opposition on federalism grounds. See 137 Cong. Rec. S8848 (1991) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman) ("I think this is the greatest example of preemption of state law that I have
encounteredsince I have been in the Senate.").That proposalultimatelydied but was raised
again in 1993 and was opposed, again, on federalismgrounds.See 139 Cong. Rec. SI 5384
(1993) (statementof Sen. Biden) (stating that the "premiseof federalism [is] that where the
States can do something on their own as well as the Federal Governmentcan do it, you
should let the States do it.").
160. There were hearings in the House but, as others have noted, although the
constitutionalissues were raised briefly, these were not the focus of the hearings.See Vicki
Jackson,Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 2180, 2239 n.255 (1998) (stating that "[o]nly one set of hearings was held on the
legislation, and it focused on guns and education"and citing the few instances where the
federalism issue was raised); Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260) (stating that "althoughthe hearingsextensively addressedthe
impact of increasing firearmsviolence upon the educationalsystem, the witnesses did not
specifically discuss the effect upon interstatecommerce of firearmspossession on or near
school property").
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counterbalancing factors- there was no debate of the issue or public
investigation of the need for national as opposed to state action. In such
circumstances, one can easily see why Lopez was chosen as the first of a set of
federalism targets; it was an easy case. One can also see, however, why it is a
trivial case in terms of its actual limits on Congress' actions. Lopez, in this
view, amounts to the announcement of a clear statement rule161- which
Congress may, through a variety of means, satisfy. This, of course, does not
answer the question of what might have happened had Congress attempted to
provide a better rationale for its actions; I leave that harder question for the
moment so that we may see how this analysis works itself out in the more
recent case of United States v. Morrison.
B. Morrison: WhereInequality Meets Commerce
Many doubted the lasting power of Lopez, suggesting that it would have
little resonance in future federalism decisions.162 Anyone following Congress'
efforts during this period could not have mistaken the possibility that there
were other statutes in the wings awaiting their federalism turn. Indeed, there
were strong indications that Lopez was simply the warm-up act for a major
confrontation between the courts and Congress that had been brewing over the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). There was little surprise, for example,
among its advocates, when the court agreed to decide United States v.
Morrison, a case challenging the constitutionality of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy.163The federal judiciary had lobbied against the bill for some time, and
the Judicial Conference had targeted it as an improper exercise of
"federalization" by Congress.164 Once the statute reached the Court, the
Justices stood by Lopez's categorical approach. The Supreme Court held that
Congress had no power to create VAWA's private civil rights remedy.165The
statute was about crime, said the Court and thus not of the "economic" sort
sanctioned by Lopez.166 According to the Court, Congress had relied on an

161. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, Symposium:Reflections on United States v.
Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 533, 552-53 (1995) (noting how easy it is to add an interstatenexus
avoiding the questionof economic impact).
requirementas a constitutional"bumper-guard,"
162. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, What's A Constitutionfor Anyway? Of History and
Theory,Bruce Ackermanand the New Deal, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 885, 885 (1996) ("[A]
growing numberof experts have concludedthat sweeping judicial revolution [afterLopez] is
unlikely.");Pollak, supra note 161, at 553 (noting that "thereis less in Lopez than meets the
eye").
163. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
164. See Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging and
Invalidatingthe ViolenceAgainst WomenAct, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 269, 271 (2000).
165. Morrison,529 U.S. at 602.
166. Id. at 613 ("Gender-motivatedcrimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity."); see also id. at 618 ("The regulation and punishment of
intrastateviolence that is not directedat the instrumentalities,channels, or goods involved in
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improper aggregative rationale that would justify any federal criminal remedy.
That, the Court said almost apocalyptically, would destroy the line between the
"truly local" and the "truly national."167
In easy cases, it might be sufficient for the Court to rely on definitional
boundaries- such as the commercial "function"- to draw a firm line between
local and national sovereignties. If Congress sought to use the Commerce
Clause to wage war, there would be an easy answer. But, Morrison was not an
easy case in this sense. Congress had worked on the Act for four years and had
articulated, albeit under the pre-Lopez cases then applicable, a rational basis for
connecting gender-based violence to commerce.168The argument was one that
had been made before in the context of the 1964 civil rights remedies- that
national commerce was "tainted"by discrimination. In a series of reports, the
Senate Judiciary Committee explained that the fear and incidence of violence
disadvantaged women as participants in a national economy (a disadvantage
manifested educationally, in employment, and otherwise economically).169 The
Supreme Court, however, found this rationale insufficient; it saw Morrison and
Lopez as parallel cases because both involved functions the Supreme Court
associated with the states ("police power" and "crime").170
There is no question that the Supreme Court was right to consider the risks
to state majorities in Morrison. As we have seen above, parallel state and
federal criminal remedies do raise federalism issues.171 But there are good
interstatecommercehas always been the province of the States . . . .").
167. We . . . reject the argumentthat Congress may regulatenoneconomic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The
Constitutionrequiresa distinctionbetween what is truly nationaland what is truly local. . . .
Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Foundersdenied
the National Governmentand reposed in the States, than the suppressionof violent crime and
vindicationof its victims.

Id. at 617-18 (internalcitationsomitted).
168. As Justice Souterwrote in his dissent, one obvious difference from Lopez was the
"mountainof data assembled by Congress, here showing the effects of violence against
women on interstatecommerce. Passage of the Act in 1994 was preceded by four years of
hearings . . . ." Id. at 628-29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internalcitations omitted); id. at 635
("Indeed, the legislative record here is far more voluminous than the record compiled by
Congressand found sufficient in two priorcases upholdingTitle II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 against Commerce Clause challenges."); see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385
(1994) ("[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstatecommerce, by deterringpotential victims from traveling interstate,from engaging
in employment in interstate business, and from transactingwith business, and in places
involved, in interstate commerce ... , by diminishing national productivity, increasing
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate
products. . . .").
169. And, indeed, the petitioner, Christy Brzonkala, had "droppedout" of college,
citing emotionaldisturbancesbecause of a rape.See Morrison,529 U.S. at 602-03.
170. "Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the
Foundersdenied the National Governmentand reposed in the States, than the suppressionof
violent crime and vindicationof its victims."Id. at 618.
171. I suspect that what motivatedthe Courtwas the suspicion, voiced in the press and
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reasons to doubt whether this was the same problem in Morrison as it was in
Lopez. VAWA's civil rights remedy created no parallel criminal penalties; it
created no cherry-picking license for federal prosecutors- it was a private civil
remedy. Perhaps more importantly, this was why state officials (presumably
representing the affected "federalism parties") supported the remedy both in
Congress and in the Supreme Court: because it was not a parallel federal
criminal law.172 The remedy was a supplementary civil rights action initiated
by private parties. In much the same way that Title VII' s sexual harassment
remedies supplement rather than supplant state tort remedies, so too would
VAWA's civil damage remedies have supplemented state civil and criminal
laws. Although evidence of state support is- and cannot be- constitutionally
determinative, any realistic assessment of the risk to state majorities presented
by the Morrison statute should take into account the states' own asserted
position.173
There is, however, a far more glaring omission in the Morrison opinion.
The states may be relatively more sensitive to majoritarian preferences, but

privately, that VAWA was not a truly majoritarian remedy. There was the fear that the
federal government, although shrouding itself in the mantle of majoritarianism, was in fact
acting on behalf of a few feminists who had bamboozled the Senate into passing the statute.
See Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, New Republic, July 12, 1993, at 12 (reporting that
feminist activists were promoting the VAWA but that at least some feminists thought the
Senate had no idea what it was passing). Knowing a bit about the remedy, myself, I know
that this story is wrong. But, even if I had not worked for the Senate at the time, I would
doubt it in large part because it is so incredibly difficult to pass any piece of legislation. In
the end, however, if this were the basis for the judicial opposition either in Congress or on
the Supreme Court, it should have been addressed as such, allowing there to be a fair
response.
172. Amici curiae representing 36 states filed briefs arguing that the civil rights remedy
in the Violence Against Women Act did not impinge on states' rights. See Brief of the States
of Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, and the Commonwealths of Massachusestts and
Puerto Rico, as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, Nos. 99-5, 9929, 1999 U.S. Briefs 5, *2 (Nov. 12, 1999) ("Section 13981 does not undermine federalism
. . ."); id. at *15-16 ("The remedy that Congress chose is a necessary complement to the
States' continuing efforts to redress gender-motivated violence, and also comports with the
The States' own
federal government's recognized role in protecting civil rights ....
assessments of their legal responses to violence against women demonstrate that state
protections remain inadequate . . . ."); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Cool to Law Protecting
Women, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2000, at A18 (noting that an additional state, Alabama, had
filed a brief on the other side).
173. Some Justices have insisted that the states and the federal government cannot, by
their agreement, render a law constitutional. At the same time, it is also true that the states,
and their real assertions of interest, should not be ignored by a court aiming to protect
federalism interests. To believe otherwise is to run the risk of enforcing federalism "against"
the states. On this and the state support in the Supreme Court, see Nourse, Vertical
Separation, supra note 37, at 780 & n.122.
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they are relatively less sensitive to minorities. Thefederalism analysis cannot
stop at countermajoritarian effect; it has to consider, as well, whether there is
a risk to state minorities. In Morrison, the Court completely ignored the risk
that states were particularly poorly situated to address the matters Congress
sought to remedy- discrimination embedded in the states' own justice systems.
If there was anything quite clear about the record that Congress compiled in
Morrison, it was that gender discrimination was pervasive and deeply rooted in
state systems (and thus likely to resist direct challenge as "intentional"
discrimination by particular actors under either state or federal antidiscrimination law).174 Moreover, Congress could rationally have concluded
that this kind of discrimination was best uprooted and illuminated by the
federal, unelected judiciary, rather than elected state judges who would have a
relatively greater incentive to lean toward majority preference at the expense of
minority protection. If this analysis of the federalism risks in Morrison is right,
the decision was far from governed by Lopez; indeed, it presented precisely the
opposite issue: Whether the federal government's relative advantage in
enforcing the demands of equality provides a rational basis on which the
federal government may intrude upon state majorities.
If this is right, this analysis should (in a perfect world) help- rather than
hinder- the effort to respond to post-Morrison concerns about the continued
constitutional status of the 1964 Civil Rights Act remedies. Although the Court
has shown no interest in overturning Katzenbach v. McClung115and Heart of
Atlanta Motel}16 there are Lopez-based arguments that would seem to put them
in jeopardy, at least to the extent the cases' overt rationales are grounded in the
Commerce Clause. A vertical analysis of Morrison may point the way toward a
more effective reconciliation of the cases and a firmer basis on which to rest
future arguments in favor of the civil rights cases.
There is no question that protecting commerce from inequalities may
intrude on localities, just as protecting commerce from unfair labor practices
does. Darby's lumber yard and Ollie's barbecue are unmistakably "local"
enterprises. A vertical analysis, however, cannot end with a risk to local
majorities. It must also include the rival effect that a shift to localities increases
the risk of individual or minority oppression. The answer to the civil rights
cases is not to pit equality against commerce but to recognize that these
rationales should reinforce the exercise of national power. Where commerce
and inequality converge, Congress 'power in these cases should be greater, not
lesser. If the national government is to guarantee the equality of all citizens- as
national citizens- it must be able to act even in the face of the opposition of
state majorities.

174. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 629-30 (listing findings of state gender bias task
forces).
175. Katzenbachv. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
176. Heartof AtlantaMotel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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The Separation of Powers and Its "Implied"Federalism
The skeptic will respond that, so far, a vertical incentive-based analysis has
not resolved the "harder" federalism case; the critic will posit a statute
regulating education or environment for which Congress has given a plausible
rationale for the exertion of national power and suggested "effects" on
commerce. If Congress, unlike in Lopez,111asserts a substantial reason for its
innovation and there is no argument, as in Morrison, that the states are
relatively poor decisionmakers because of state bias, we appear to have a
harder case. Indeed, we must confront the "truth"of federalism that the Court
so assiduously ignores. Just as with the separation of powers, where we know
that the administrative state tends to resist neat functional divisions, we also
know that, in a national, indeed globalized, economy, there is little (including
family law and divorce) that does not have a "connection" to our commercial
life. When the categories run out, we must look to constitutional structure,
where that structureis understood not as a set of categorical labels but, instead,
as a set of relationships to the people. Enter the separation of powers and its
"implied federalism" dimension.
Let us assume that, in Lopez, Congress had set forth a plausible rationale
for asserting the commerce power. Let us imagine, for example, that Congress
put together a record showing increasing national gang activity- that the Crips
and the Bloods had fanned out across the nation, posing a threat to school
children and that one way in which these gangs obtained members was by
enlisting them in a culture that proved one was "macho" by carrying a gun in
school. Let us also posit that state authorities, and various state organizations,
had testified in Congress that they needed federal help to stop the flow of guns
to the Crips and the Bloods. Such a case is clearly harder than Lopez or
Morrison. We cannot simply say that Congress has failed (as in Lopez) or that
there is an obvious federal interest that the states cannot fulfill because of bias
(as I have argued about Morrison).
In the more difficult case, our federalism question comes down to a
question of the separation of powers. Presumably, if one cares about
federalism, one should want doubts resolved by the national institution most
likely to reflect the interests of the states (albeit at the federal level). And here,
the answer seems straightforward.As a relative matter, and at the federal level,
it is more likely that Congress (versus the Supreme Court) will be able to
reflect, and thus protect, the majoritarianpreferences of the people in the states

177. It is one thing to decide, as in Lopez, that a Congress that fails to provide a
constitutive claim for national authority must do better. In such a case, it seems to me
perfectly appropriatefor a court to identify the risk and demandthat Congress provide some
justification;at the very least, such a "clearstatement"rule increasesthe political saliency of
the issue and thus providesthe opportunityfor dissentersto vocalize their opposition.
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and localities. And this is true, or at least relativelytrue, whetheror not one
believes that the nationalgovernmentadequatelyrepresentsthe states or their
sovereigntyin some absolute sense. There may be no perfect fit, but wise
structuralpresumptionsdo not, by definition,always fit perfectly.It may be
that, in any individualcase, the SupremeCourt will do a betterjob than
Congressof reflectingthe will of the states'citizenry.But as a predictionbased
on structuralincentive, it seems fair to say that the least representative
- the judiciary- is least favorably positioned to reflect the
department
majoritarian(or for that matter minoritarian)preferences of states and
localities.
All of this suggeststhe propriety(at least in doubtfulcases) of a strongrule
of judicial deferenceto Congress'judgmentsabout risks to state majorities.
Such a rule, of course,has been the law for some time- or at least was the law
untilLopez.Verticalanalysis,however,offers a sounderreasonfor thatrule of
deferencethanargumentsaboutwhethertherereally"are"effects on commerce
or whetherthese effects are "substantial"
enoughto satisfythe SupremeCourt.
Moreover,the reason for deferenceoffered by vertical analysis comes from
federalism itself- the impliedfederalism that, in part, generates the national
governmentin threeseparatedepartments.Note thatthis is not the Wechslerian
claim that the federal governmentprotectsstate sovereignty.Instead,it is a
claim basedon the fact thatthe people's relationto theirfederalgovernmentis
mediatedby the people's relationto the states;it is in states,not in the nation,
that the people vote for membersof Congressand vote for a Presidentand,
throughthese, appointSupremeCourtJustices.One need not believe, as an
empiricalor legislativematter,that Congressor the Presidentalways protects
the statesor statesovereignty,in fact or in theory,to recognizethat,as a matter
of relative relation (with emphasison the relative), the courts are less well
situatedthanCongressor the Presidentto assess the needs of the citizenryof
statesand localities.178And, as a result,the answerin our more complexcase
shouldturnon deferenceby the SupremeCourtto the politicaldepartments.
One might arguethat this move to the separationof powers is too quick
because,if this is true,thenall questionsof judicialreviewarequestionsraising
separationof powers issues. I recognizethatmanythinkthatthe separationof
powers cases constitute a set of discrete, eccentric cases about structural
innovation (in other words, about independent counsels and sentencing
commissionsand legislativevetoes), but I do not believe thatthis fits with the
original understandingof our Constitution'sstructureor the doctrine of
separatedpowers.Nor do I believe thatthe implicationsof a moregeneralized
178. To some extent, this analysis explains the paradoxicalposition of Lopez. As the
subject of scholarly discussion, Lopez has been written about extensively and many have
found that it representsa significant statementof principle. But as a fact of real life, Lopez
representsvery little change in the standardoperatingproceduresof federalism.See Pollak,
supra note 161 (noting how easy it is for Congress to avoid Lopez by adding an interstate
travelrequirementin its criminalstatutes).
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view- that exercise of judicial power to overrule a federal statute raises
separationof powers issues- is particularlycontroversial.Modern scholars
have readilyconsideredjudicialreview as a matterof the relationof judicialto
difficulty, and our obsession
legislative power.179If the countermajoritarian
with it, means anything,it means that judicial review has been considered
(albeit inadequately)as a reflection of structuralconcerns for some time
now.180
But thereis an importantqualificationto this point. Thereis a difference,
and it was consideredan importantdifferenceat the foundingof the nation,
betweenthe SupremeCourtoverrulinga federalstatuteandthe SupremeCourt
overrulinga state statute.In cases consideredtoday as ones of federalism(for
example,cases of congressionalpowerunderthe CommerceClause),it is often
assumed that the principalstructuralissue is vertical (involving the federal
governmentversusthe states),and this is contrastedwith the review of federal
statutes(which is consideredprimarilya matterof horizontalrelation,between
the courtsand Congress).I am arguinghere, contraryto this convention,that
review of state statutesalso has importanthorizontal(separationof powers)
implications.
A SupremeCourtthatroutinelystrikesdown statelaws (whetherunderthe
First,Fifth,or FourteenthAmendment)assertsits powernot only vis-a-vis the
states but also vis-a-vis the other national departments as potential
decisionmakers.By asserting that the courts' constitutive relations, their
relations to the people (relatively distant ones), should govern federalism
issues, the Courtassertsits decisionmakingauthorityand its removalfromthe
people as appropriaterelativeto that of Congressand the President.Whether
this arises because the issue is dubbedone of Section Five power underthe
FourteenthAmendmentor becauseit is dubbedone of the "commercepower"
is irrelevantto this assessment;both raise importantquestionsabouthorizontal
constitutionalstructure,or separationof powers.181
If this is right,then every time that the Courtdecides a federalismcase it
finds itself in a ratherparadoxicalposition- it assertsthe powerof the national
departmentleast likely to reflect the wishes of state citizens in the name of
states.182From this institutionaldifference, some have asserted absolutist
179. See generally BlCKEL,supra note 3, at 16 (describing the "root difficulty" of
force"in our system).
judicial review in institutionalterms as a "counter-majoritarian
180. On the academic obsession with this issue, see Barry Friedman,The Birth of an
Academic Obsession: The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112
Yale. L.J. 153(2002).
181. Post & Siegel, supra note 7, at 1945-50 (considering the separationof powers
implicationsof the Section 5 power).
182. Lest this seem like an academic paradox, one need only refer to the actual
litigation in UnitedStates v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598 (2000), in which state attorneygenerals
argued, in the Supreme Court, that the remedy struck down by the Supreme Court on
federalismgroundswas not in fact inconsistentwith states' rights. For relevant background
materials,see supra note 172.
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rules- that the Supreme Court should never or should always decide federalism
questions. But absolutism of this sort bears its own risks: Under the "no
review" scenario, Congress is encouraged to believe that it can ignore the
states; under the "review always" scenario, the Supreme Court is encouraged to
believe that there are no limits to its power to assess the will of majorities. Both
institutions may be wrong, and thus both must be encouraged to practice
institutional humility, to recognize the limits of their own constitutive structure.
Congress must understand that, in some cases, its need for action and results
(the "constitutive virtues")183may work to silence the claims of state citizens;
the Court must understand that its lack of connection to the people will mean
that it may actually harm state and national citizens in the name of an imagined
legal geography.184
IV. Implications of Verticality
It is time, now, to situate this approach in a larger theoretical frame.. If a
constitution is more than something for courts to interpret, as the popular
constitutionalism literature suggests, then we must reconsider the
judiciocentrism of conventional theories of constitutional structure. The
theories of Ely, Bickel, and Choper185are no longer enough because the focus
of the telescope has widened from a theory of judicial review to a theory of the
whole Constitution and its application to all of the departments. Put in other
words, we must consider the possibility that no theory of judicial review will
suffice unless it begins with a theory of constitutional structure.
A. The Question of Constitutional Ontology
No one who looks candidly at the administrative state can say that our
Constitution divides our government by function. We may still cling to this
legal process ideal, but by now it is well-known that each of the departments
performs each of the functions (executive, legislative, and judicial).186 In such

183. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 159, at 615-16 (discussing these constitutive
virtues).
184. See, e.g., Nourse, VerticalSeparation,supra note 37, at 801-02.
185. See Bickel, supra note 3, at chs. 1 & 4 (arguing that the "root difficulty for
constitutionallaw was that "judicialreview is a counter-majoritarian
force," and arguingfor
the passive virtuesas an importantresponse to the potential"deviance"and "activism"of the
courts in constitutionalcontroversies,id. at 128, of the court);Choper, supra note 3, at chs.
2-5 (arguing that the power of judicial review should extend only to the protection of
individualrights ratherthan structuralmatters,such as federalismand separationof powers
cases); Ely, supra note 3 (offering a representation-reinforcement
theory as a means of
legitimatingjudicial review).
186. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
L. Rev. 488, 492 (1987) ("Virtually
Questions- A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL
every part of the governmentCongress has created- the Departmentof Agricultureas well
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a world, to assert a function-based view is simply wishful thinking and even a
misreading of the text itself (which jumbles functional descriptions).187 And,
yet, the functional ideal remains pervasive. Virtually all the principal
constitutional methodologies - from textualism to originalism to pragmatismproceed upon this basis when trying to resolve structural problems. We have
textualist theories of structure that depend upon function188 and originalist
theories of structure that depend upon function;189we have individual rights
theories190 and formalist theories,191 and even game theories,192 of structure
that rely upon function. It is precisely because these methodologies rely upon
this idea (that government amounts to a description of separate and discrete
activities) that they have failed over and over again to illuminate how the
Constitution actually governs.
So far, I have tried to show that it is possible and even attractive to
construct a constitutional anatomy grounded in governing relations rather than
in functional descriptions. I have also tried to show that, once function is
understood as a proxy for risks to constituency, this helps moderate the
apparent contradictions of a variety of categorical judgments and illuminates
what was known at the founding of the nation: that federalism and the

as the Securities and Exchange Commission- exercises all three of the governmental
functionsthe Constitutionso carefullyallocates among Congress,President,and Court.").
187. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanyingtext (arguingthat the text may be read
to give "executive" and "judicial" power to the Senate and "legislative" power to the
President).This was, of course, a complaint of the Antifederalistsand, as such, was well
known to James Madisonand others.See supra note 95.
188. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 26, at 1175-76 (assuming that the vesting
clauses of Articles II and III strongly supporta functionaldivision of powers that grantsthe
executive all executive power); Redish & Cisar, supra note 16, at 455 (arguing for a
traditionalallocation of authoritythat depends upon the notion that "the exercise of each
branch's power is to be limited to the functions definitionally brought within those
concepts").
189. See Carter,supra note 24, at 765, 783 (arguingfor an approachbased on relatively
determinatemeanings of the "text and its historical background,"that, when applied, relies
on the idea of function). Even those who are not originalists, but who take a historical
approach,have tended to embracethe idea of function uncritically,despite good evidence of
the difficulty of the very idea of governmentalfunction in the foundingperiod.See Gerhard
Casper, Separating Power: Essays on the Founding Period 1 (1997) (attributinga
"functional"separationof powers to the founding);MartinS. Flaherty,The Most Dangerous
Branch, 105 Yale. L.J. 1725, 1732 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of a historical
approachthat assumes a functional ideal). But see Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional
Commitmentto Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 1381, 1385 (1998) (questioningthe projectionof modernconcepts of judicial function
onto early Americanpractice).
190. See Brown, supra note 27, at 1513-14 (urging thatthe separationof powers serves
to protectindividualrightsand relying upon an assumptionabout functionaldivision).
191. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 16, at 455 (assuming a functional division of
powers in offering a pragmaticformalistapproach).
192. See Eskridge& Ferejohn,supra note 92 (assuming a functionalideal in applyinga
game theoreticapproach).
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separation of powers are generatively intertwined.193 There may well be
something quite natural in the ideal of an "activities" constitution: It hails from
the single most influential legal movement in the late twentieth century- the
legal process movement with all its enthusiasm for institutional competences
and purposes.194That a functionally driven constitutional ontology should be
natural to legal process scholars should not mean, however, that it is inevitable
or true or even illuminating.
The relations of governance have eluded us, at least in part, because
constitutional scholars have, for the last generation, been obsessed with
creating a methodology for judicial review.195 Importantly, a vertical,
incentive-based analysis does not proceed from that assumption. I have not
asserted a textual model for deciding structural cases (although I think my
argument does rely upon text- the text that creates the relations between the
people and their government). I have not claimed, for example, that my
approach commands respect because it allows the judiciary to choose the
"right" values in a laundry list of potential values served by the separation of
powers or federalism.196To be sure, I have placed the representative relation at
the core of the analysis, but I have not, and this is very importantto recognize,
insisted that representation always succeeds or is always a positive value.
Representation might fail entirely either in particular cases or more generally,
and this theory might still be the best approach we can devise to understandthe
effects of innovation on constitutional structure. Similarly, I have resisted the
notion that text or history- as methodologies associated with judicial reviewshould operate as interpretive trumps; indeed, I have rejected the classic
textualist and originalist arguments and insisted upon the poverty of using
vesting clause jurisprudence as a means to understandthe whole Constitution.
I have managed to avoid this search for a judicial methodology because I
have changed the question- from how a court should "review" structuralcases
to a question that I think should have priority: what the structure of the
Constitution is, whether it is a set of legal descriptions or something more ~ a
set of governing relations and incentives. Much of the constitutional
interpretationliterature has tended to make an important assumption- that the
structure of the Constitution is a set of words that describe and thus cabin the
world of power, that constitutional structureis no different in this respect from
the rest of the Constitution, it is simply "ordinarylaw." And this seems to apply

193. See supra PartI.B; supra notes 47-48 (discussing the role of state representational
concerns in allocatingpower at the nationallevel).
194. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 141-42
(1994) (discussing the importanceof the legal process movement). Interestinglyenough, one
of the synonyms for "function"is "purpose,"an idea associated with the legal process
school. Anothermeaning,however, is "gathering,"as in a cocktail partyas a function.
195. See supra notes 3-4.
196. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 73, at 432-37 (listing a variety of "values" such as
efficiency and accountabilityand rule of law served by the separationof powers).
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whether one is a textualist or a pragmatist or an originalist. There is no open
dispute among textualists or pragmatists or even originalists about how the
structural text is law, only questions about how courts should interpret what
seems, indisputably, to be law. The words are thought to constrain government
by virtue of a binding edict of legal interpretation.
If anything I have said about structure illuminates, it does so precisely
because I have departed from this assumption. I have tried to consider the
whole Constitution prior to attempting to reach the question of judicial review.
And I have treated the Constitution not only as ordinary law but as fundamental
law, by which I mean a law that, first and foremost, creates a set of dynamic
relations between the people and their government. It is importantto remember
that this "constitutive" understanding is as grounded in the text as is a more
descriptive approach. I have simply focused on texts that are ignored in
standard textualist approaches. The texts I have considered are ignored for a
reason: They are not considered the appropriate kind of "constitutional law."
And they are not considered the appropriate kind of "constitutional law"
because they are not the kind of texts that courts typically cast as capable of
"
<l
interpretation as ordinary law. They are not the proper kind of texts because
they actually create the government ratherthan describe it.
Why should descriptive texts take priority in standard interpretive
methodologies? They take priority, I believe, because they are consistent with a
vision of constitutional law that is a projection of courts' own institutional
mission. Courts proceed upon the theory that the Constitution constrains
political power by judicial interpretation(for example, in defining executive or
judicial or state power, it is thought that courts constrain political bodies). But,
if I am right that the constitutive texts are crucial to understandingthe structure
of the Constitution, then there is more than an "ordinary law" approach to
consider. The Constitution constrains not only by "ordinarylaw," but also by a
fundamental, embedded law of constitutive relations to the people. Those
relations work everyday, not simply the days on which the Supreme Court
holds forth on federalism or the separation of powers. Indeed, if Larry Kramer
is right, constitutionalists have failed to appreciate the ancient distinction
between the constitution as "fundamental law" which governs political
structure and the constitution as "ordinary law" binding in standard
judiciocentric terms.197

197. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 34 ("Constitutionalor
fundamentallaw subsisted as an independentmodality, distinct from both politics and from
the ordinary law interpretedand enforced by courts. It was a special category of law. It
possessed critical attributesof ordinarylaw: Its obligations were meant to be binding, for
example, and its content was not a matterof mere will or policy but reflected rules whose
meaning was determined by argument based on precedent, analogy, and principle. Yet
constitutionallaw also purportedto govern the sovereign itself, thus generatingcontroversies
that were inherently matters for resolution in a political domain.") (citation to draft
manuscripton file with author).
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To be sure, this view of fundamental, performed law, of incentive and
relation, is not complete; it does nothing to supplant the court's interpretiverole
when applying ordinary law. And yet the conventional view - that the ordinary
law model is complete- should by now be seen as false. Put simply, the
document does not only "say" or "report"what it is doing, but it creates and
releases the public's political energies. Constituent relations are the
Constitution's structure, or at least they have as great a claim to structural
consideration as do the words that describe particular powers or departments.
To see the relevant constitutional text as limited to those terms most hospitable
to judicial "interpretation"is, in the end, to risk seeing constitutional structure
as a means for judicial review; it is to risk a court that looks into the
Constitution and sees only itself.
B. The Case of the Empty Constitution
To understandthe dangers of the judiciocentric view, let us begin with the
most immediately compelling of constitutional methodologies, textualism
(which for sake of clarity I will call "judicial textualism" because it takes as its
starting point the judiciocentric position on the nature of the Constitution).
Judicial textualism198 gives us a vision of the separation of powers heavily
dependent upon the precise terminology of certain parts of the Constitution, and
most particularly, the vesting clauses, down to the "hereinafters,""ands," and
"ors."199From the position of a judicial textualist, the argument I have offered
here is deeply flawed because it relies upon the wrong "text"- the words
"legislative," "executive," and "states" are the "real" text, not the constitutive
provisions creating the bodies that govern us.
But the judicial textualists' problem with this anatomy cannot be that the
argument is not based on text. The constitutive texts are very important texts
indeed. The real debate must be about something other than raw textuality.
When we look to the constitutive texts, we do not reach for the dictionary to
determine the "meaning" of voting or representation. We do not "translate"the
term "representation" or search for an equivalent legal expression from the
present or past. Instead, the meaning of these provisions resides in what they
198. The principalfeatureof "judicialtextualism,"as I am using that term here, is that
it focuses on the words in the vesting clauses or other clauses in the Constitution that
describe federal and state institutions and thus appear to demand that the analysis depend
upon the meaningof such specific terms as "commerce"or "executive"or "state."
199. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 26, at 1175-76 (relying upon precise
differences in the vesting clauses to make inferences about constitutional structure:"The
most obvious difference [between the three vesting clauses] is that the Article II and III
vesting clauses omit the qualifying language 'herein granted' found in the vesting clause of
Article I. What significance can be attributedto this omission? To begin with, it suggests
that the Presidentis to have all of the executive power and the Article IIIjudiciary is to have
all of the judicial power.") (emphasis in original). But see U.S. Const, art. I, § 7 (granting
the Presidentpower to veto bills, in an articledevoted to "legislativepowers").
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do, in what they create, in their performance, in their constitution, in thefuture.
Article I, Section 2 provides that the "House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States . . . ."200Article II, as amended, provides that electors appointed by the
states shall vote for a President and Vice-President.201These provisions create
relations that then constitute government by people acting upon them. Thus, the
importance of the constitutive provisions is not their meaning to courts, but
their meaning to the Constitution of real, political, life- to those who are
silenced and to those whose voices are amplified, to the people constituted in
various political constituencies.
The real debate here, then, is not about textuality. Instead, the real debate is
about what the text is. If one believes that constitutional structureis only about
allocating a set of characteristic activities (or functions), then one is looking for
the text to speak about activities (or functions).202And if one is asking such a
question, then the vesting clauses are the places where the relevant language
can be found. Notice, however, how this entire train of thought perpetuates its
assumptions, how the original ontological assumption (that one is looking for
an "activities" text to be translated by a court) finds itself repeated in the
ultimate conclusion. We are now in a position to see the paradoxes created by a
"judiciocentricposition" toward constitutional structure.
Observe, first, how the textualist methodology has found the text rather
than the text finding the methodology. Because the judicial interpreter is
looking for a set of words that a court might apply, translate, or redefine, she
seizes upon the vesting clauses. Once we know that there is more text to be
considered (the constitutive provisions), this leads to the paradox thatjudicial
methodology has become more important than the text- since, if one wanted to
consider the entire text, one would have to take some account of the
constitutive provisions. Moreover, there are significant effects to this
privileging of textualist theory: Notice what has happened to the whole text,
which literally has been "emptied" of governance. The vesting clauses present
us with a mere picture of a government, a word painting that depicts organized
"competencies" or "functions" or "purposes,"but provides no actual means for
elections or representation or voting. If the vesting clauses and associated texts

200. U.S. Const, art. I, § 2. The full provision goes on to furtherspecify the relation
between individualsand the House by providingfor apportionmentof representativesamong
the states.
201. U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, amendedby U.S. Const, amend. XII (separatingthe votes
for Presidentand Vice-President).
202. To ask of constitutionalstructurewhetheran innovationis within the institution's
competence is simply to ask the "function question"- that is, to ask whether a particular
activity belongs within a departmentbecause of the department'scharacteristicactivities. To
ask the "legal process question"thus alreadyassumes that courts, agencies, and Congress are
what they do.
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are all there is,203 then we have quite literally elevated the needs of judicial
review above those of governance.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, notice how judicial textualism
appears to elevate some of the least importantprovisions of the Constitution to
a place where they become the most important in structural theory.204 The
vesting clauses can be eliminated with little effect on real governance.205And
yet they have been the center of attention in constitutional theory and case law.
They are, in other words, importantin a world in which the Constitution is what
courts and lawyers do; courts look to this kind of text because this is the kind of
text that "can" be interpreted. But, in such a world, we risk our government
being emptied of its content- the courts confidently standing by with an
exquisitely ordered legal universe inhabited by no one.
Judicial textualism, as an interpretive methodology, is parasitic of the very
idea that I am challenging- a constitutional ontology that celebrates, albeit
without identification, the Constitution as the "sole province" of the judiciary.
The "text" that courts see is, in this sense, a text of their own making. This selfreferentiality, however, is not limited to textualist claims but applies to other
constitutional methodologies as well. It is just as easy, for example, to find a
textualist theory of the separation of powers that is built upon the search for a
descriptive and legalistic essentialism (function as read into the text) as it is to
find a historical theory built upon the same premise (function as read into
history).206Originalists (despite the risks of presentism in the functional ideal)
have enthusiastically embraced the notion of function, looking for functions in

203. This way of statingthe argumentowes much to conversationswith Scott Shapiro.
204. The costs of this erasure may be quite significant in the real world- to real
majorities and minorities. Consider the decision in Morrison v. Olson (the independent
counsel case), a case thattoday is widely consideredto have been wrongly decided. 487 U.S.
654 (1988). Standardaccounts tell us that the decision was wrong because the Court's
majority failed to apply textual analysis: All executive power did not remain in the
executive. But this analysis, as I have arguedelsewhere, emphasizedthe linguistic risks of a
particularcategory ("executive")and ignored the real risks to the individualfrom Congress'
prosecutorial actions and to majorities from the independent counsel's ties to the
impeachmentprocess. Nourse, VerticalSeparation,supra note 37, at 768-72.
205. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanyingtext.
206. See Flaherty,supra note 189, at 1744 ('The other historicist school of separation
of powers scholarshipunderminesthe Unitarianposition. Here, the argumentruns that the
Foundersthemselves mainly possessed a functional approach. . . ."). Professor Flahertyis
here referring to "functionalism"as a school of thought, but it is also true that the
"functionalists"about which he speaks, as well as his own article, relies upon the idea of
function as uncontroversial.As Flahertyrecognizes, the founderswere quite confused about
what the departmentsor the separation of powers would actually "do." See id. at 1776
("American constitutionalists did not in fact advance a comprehensive conception of
separationof powers . . . ."). In my view, as I have written elsewhere, the founderswere far
more certain about what "relations"would govern the departments(precisely because those
relations were at the heart of the debate at the constitutionalconvention and were, in fact,
enumeratedin the text), than they were of more modern ideas of the "purposes"of the
doctrine.See Nourse, Due Foundation,supra note 46, at 459-63, 493-97.
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the ratification debates or at the Convention, in the First Congress or in
Madison's massive correspondence.207Each of these interpretersis looking for
a rule for courts and finds such a rule by searching for texts that can be used by
courts.208
This argument, if right, has important implications for standard views of
constitutional methodology. To the extent that theories of structure based on
text or history or precedent all search for an ideal that privileges judicial
review, then these theories are "picking and choosing" relevant text or
history- picking and choosing based on which text best matches what courts
do. The textualist picks and chooses the vesting clauses as the "right text" and
never looks, or even considers "as text," the constitutive provisions. The
historical view takes its cue from this same notion, looking for historical
divisions of executive, legislative, and judicial power, or perhaps something
more generally purposive like balance or energy, and yet ignores history
showing the importance the Founders attached to generative relations. Finally,
precedential views, in their development of formal and functional models, tend
to repeat this error,taking their cue as well from the essentialist ideas of state or
federal, executive or legislative. If this is right, by privileging a narrowly
"descriptivist" vision of the Constitution rather than a "constitutive" and more
popular one, the standardconstitutional methodologies tend to risk judicial selfreferentiality. If the only evidence that an investigator uses is the evidence that
207. See Flaherty, supra note 189, at 1801 ("Final confirmation for a functional
understandingcomes from the national debate over whether to ratify the Constitution,
arguably the most importantsource of all ... ."). Again, this is referringto the modern
doctrinalposition of "functionalism,"as contrastedwith formal lines: Flaherty'sown picture
is more complex, preferring,as historiansoften do, the purposes/functionsof accountability
and energy and balance to the terms executive and legislative, but these ends, however more
elegant and historically more accurate,partakeof the intellectual structureof the standard
inquiry.See, e.g., id. at 1832.
208. Interpretivetheories based on representationdo not avoid this problem. Professor
BickeFs "passive virtues" theory, for example, is justified as a form of deference to
legislative majorities.See Bickel, supra note 3, at ch. 4. And, yet, this view is placed in the
service of a theory, not of the entire Constitution,but of something higher and better"judicialreview." Similarly, Professor Ely's work is fully consistent with the view that the
Constitutionmust protectagainstminoritarianbiases but, again, his theory, like Bickel's, is a
theory of "judicialreview." See Ely, supra note 3, at ch. 4. Both theories privilege courts
openly and develop a view of courts which depends on an oversimplified dichotomy
between law and politics. Under Ely's view, one only cares about politics because of
legislatures' failures and, under Bickel's view, one only cares about politics because of
courts' failures. Neither view finds any reason to distinguish between the House and the
Senate, the Presidentand Congress;we might as well simply have one big institutionwe call
the "political"one. The claimed deference of these theories to politics is really quite the
opposite for both theories are, as RichardParkerhas put it, "disdainful"of ordinarypolitical
energies, energies that are at the heart of a constitutive anatomy of constitutionalstructure.
See Richard D. Parker, "Here the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist
reflects an ironic
Manifesto 67-70 (1994) (arguingthat the cliche of countermajoritarianism
disdain for politics). Politics, in what I take to be the Constitution'ssense of it, must be more
robustlydefined thanas simply "anythingotherthan law."
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works for his method or perspective, then his method has become more
importantthan his results.
In the end, the Constitution's own text tells us that judicial textualism must
be wrong as a structural theory. For if one is claiming that the argument is
legitimate because it is textual, then one cannot be picking and choosing one's
text. If the constitutive provisions of the Constitution count for anything- and
they must- then judicial textualism has contradicted its own claims to
legitimacy.
C. Political Economy, History, and Convergence
Finally, it is time to answer the critic who argues that I have done just what
I have complained that others have done, that is, I have focused on alternative
explanations for Supreme Court cases and even, impliedly, set forth a theory of
judicial review of structural matters. Yes, I have sought to show how the
"constitutive provisions" in the Constitution might illuminate particular legal
issues. (My aim here, at least in part, is not only to lay out abstract theory, but
also to show how this might actually illuminate real political controversies.)
And I believe that courts can apply such an analysis; indeed, in the guise of the
amorphous notion of "accountability," some Justices have already attempted to
do just that.209And yet I have tried, as I show below, to avoid the pitfalls of
self-referentiality that typically accompany the "judiciocentric position." The
text as descriptor, as constraint-by-court, should be respected and will work in
easy cases to resolve structuralcontroversies, but in hardercases, we must look
deeper. The courts are, after all, charged with understandingthe Constitution as
a whole. And a "whole" understanding, in my view, must recognize that the
Constitution constrains and regulates power not only by its words, but also by
its very structureand relations.
I have started with a theory that seeks to better describe the Constitution as
a whole, with all of its provisions: those that look like they are ripe for
interpretationand those that generate governance. Having said that, whether or
not this particular theory proves workable, the most important point here
reduces to a simpler question of humility. It would be wise, in my view, if
courts were to consider themselves among equals and if they were to embrace a
view of the whole Constitution in which all departments are enjoined and
entitled to consider constitutional questions- not because this would always
yield correct results, but because it would give living meaning to the generative
provisions of the Constitution as well as to the judicial ones. It would also be
wise if Congress and the President were to take that view. But even if one were
not to accept these recommendations in a strong form, one could nevertheless
accept the need for greater self-consciousness by all institutions about their
relative role in the polity.
209. See, e.g., Clintonv. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710 (1997) (Breyer,J., concurring).

February2004]

ANATOMY
TOWARDA NEW CONSTITUTIONAL

895

Perhaps this is simply wishful thinking; perhaps institutional incentives are
so strong that a court cannot do anything but see the constitutional world in its
own judiciocentric image.210 But there are reasons to worry about how far the
Supreme Court has taken this view in recent years. There are real life
consequences to structural controversies, and none of our governmental
institutions- political or judicial- have been particularly good at predicting
these consequences. We now know, for example, that the Supreme Court in
Clinton v. Jones was spectacularly wrong to predict that its decision would
have no effect on the presidency: that civil suit led to the impeachment of a
sitting president.211We also know that the Court's decision in Morrison v.
Olson deeply minimized the potential harm of independent prosecutions and
completely ignored the risks of an independent counsel's recommendations for
impeachment.212
This evidence suggests that there is far more at stake for the people, and for
our government, than our present structural models predict. It also suggests
why we have been unable to do better: because all of our attention has been
focused in other directions, on painting an accurate linguistic portrait of power
rather than on understanding how incentives and relations shape power. How,
then, one might ask, are we to discover a more realistic account of structureand
avoid the seemingly inevitable selection bias of contemporary constitutional
methodologies?
My best answer, one that is embedded in the account given above (and
purposely so), is that we must look outside judicial discourse. We must borrow
techniques and concepts from other disciplines so that we avoid "cooking up"
another "ism," a principle or doctrine applied to decide constitutional cases that
reflects more about courts and legal demands than those of the people.213 To
avoid such a constitutional law, we must temper our legalistic blinders by
testing our views against history and economics and political theory. That does
not mean, and I emphasize this, that we must adopt a new "law and . . ."
technique, ratherthan a law "in" approach.214We should not defer wholesale to
theories built for other purposes, whether from economics or history or politics.

210. See DOUGLAS,
supra note 19.
211. For how judicial involvement changed the case for impeachment, see Nourse,
Vertical Separation, supra note 37, at 770 ("It is the judicial proceeding that transforms
public denials into claims of perjury. . .:").
212. Id. at 772-777. These are only the most dramaticof cases. A similargap exists, for
example, between the SupremeCourt's rationalein Mistrettaand the real life effects of the
sentencing commission. The Commission has had an enormous impact on prosecutorial
practices, individual rights, and judicial behavior. These are well documented phenomena.
See, e.g., Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in
the Federal Courts (1998).
213. See Parker, supra note 208, at 66 (1994).
214. The original law "and" society movement was, in fact, a law "in" society
movement. See William N. Eskridge,Jr., In Memoriam:WillardHurst, Master of the Legal
Process, 1997 Wise. L. Rev 1181, 1183.
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Instead, we need to seek convergence and independent confirmation. We must
assert hypotheses based upon the whole text and its history and then test our
theories against the findings of others.215And, in that effort, we must import
concepts and understandings that give us a richer and more realistic sense of
what is at stake, in structuraltheory- for the people.
The principal way in which I have tried to close this gap and, at the same
time, control against judiciocentric bias, is to start with assumptions supported
by a convergence of law, history, and political economy. For example, I have
focused on the Constitution (the whole Constitution) as constructing a set of
relations (between the people and their governors). This assumption minimizes
the extent to which we begin from a judiciocentric position. Not only have I
tried to avoid privileging courts, but I have also used the idea of a "relation,"
purposely trying to minimize the offstage moralizations that often come with
more concrete descriptions such as "representation." This approach has the
benefit of making the initial stance toward a structural question more selfconscious, first defining a baseline and then focusing on changes in structural
configurations.
This focus on relations and incentives resonates not only with history and
text, but also with a rich literatureon political economy. Indeed, one might say
that the study of incentives sits at the core of the modern political economy
literature.216At the same time, this notion is not simply presentist- one can
find it in the ratification debates and scattered throughout the constitutional
convention. Like modern political economists, the Framers wanted to make
predictions- even crude predictions- about what the Constitution's structure
would accomplish.217As both legal scholars and political scientists have noted,
the founders' view of political relations and incentives resonates with a variety
of work in modern political science.218 And, finally, of course, this focus on
incentives finds a home in the text- in the generative texts that create such
incentives, whether they be provisions about election or appointment or
removal.
If incentives form a key piece to this puzzle, so does a more careful focus

215. In future work, I aim to measure this claim, about shifting incentives and
relations,against historicalaccountsof actual structuralconflicts.
216. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional change and
Economic Performance 3 (1990) (emphasizinghow all institutions"structureincentives in
humanexchange, whetherpolitical, social, or economic");see also Arnold, supra note 68,
at 6-8 (analyzing the ways in which electoral incentives and potentialpolicy preferencesof
voters constraincongressionalaction).
217. See, e.g., X The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution: Ratification by the States: Virginia, supra note 45, at 1371 (statementof
Mr. Monroe, June 18, 1788) ("The President ought to act under the strongest impulses of
rewardsand punishments,which are the strongestincentives to humanactions.").
218. See Cass R. Sunstem, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 Geo. L.J. 2267,
2269 (1998) ("[T]he Framers wedded an understandingof likely incentive effects to the
basic topic of institutionaldesign . . . .").
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on analyzing shifting incentive structures.Lawyers consistently engage in
labelingexercises;the meaningof wordsis theirtradeand so they tendto think
in definitionalterms.In the contextof structuraltheory,however,this kind of
"linguisticaffinity"standardcan simply perpetuateselection bias. Thus, for
example,if one begins by askingaboutfunction,and one is lookingfor a term
that"meansfunction,"then one will simply extendthe judiciocentricbias to a
new linguisticsituation.One of the ways a generativeanatomyaims to avoid
the dangersof this kind of "matchinggame"is to make explicit the natureof
the inquiry.One sets forththe baselineconditionof the relationone assumesto
be correct (based on an acceptance of the relations enumeratedin the
Constitution)andthenasks how those relationschangeandwhat incentivesthe
new relationis likely to bringto bearon the structuralinnovation.This helps in
terms of candor (it is always possible that one's baseline assumptionsare
incorrect);and also helps in forcing the analysis to focus on the change in
structure(the differencebetweena stateof affairswith one set of incentivesas
against another). This focus on comparison, or alternatives, is again
characteristicof work in politicaleconomyas well as debatesthatthe founders
themselves had about "alternative"forms of governance.A brief look, for
example, at Madison's defense of constitutionalstructurein The Federalist
makes clear that his views were largely formed in the crucible of political
experienceand comparisonto the best available institutionalanalogues (the
stateconstitutions).219
Ultimately,the key principleI take fromthe politicaleconomyliteratureis
simply that there are significantcosts to individualdecisionmakingand that
these costs are likely to have an effect on the formationof groups,majorities
andminoritiesalike. Forexample,decisionmakingat smallnumbersis likely to
be very easy butat largenumbersmay be farmorecostly. This emphasison the
transactioncosts of decisionmakingis shared by a variety of scholars of
politicaleconomy,fromJamesM. Buchananand GordonTullock,220to Oliver
Williamsonand Douglass North.221Notice, however, that in borrowingthis
concept,I have not limitedit to particularpoliticaltheoriesbut, in deferenceto
my readingof the Founding,have combinedwhat are sometimesconsidered
antitheticalpoliticalrisks. I do not assume,here, for example,thatgovernment
always malfunctionsor small interestgroups always win (a staple of some

219. The Federalist No. 47, at 327-31 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961)
(examining state constitutional experience); The Federalist No. 48, at 334-38 (James
Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (examining the experience of the state constitutions on
the separationof powers).
220. See, e.g., BUCHANAN
& TULLOCK,
supra note 80, at 112 ("The expected costs of
organizingdecision, under any given rule, will be less in the smaller unit than in the larger,
assumingthatthe populationsof each are roughly comparable.")(emphasis in original).
221. North, supra note 216, at ch. 4 (emphasizingthe role of institutionsin reducing
transactioncosts); Williamson,supra note 148 (arguingthat there are diminishingreturnsto
scale in all organizationsdue to organizationaltransactioncosts).
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modern public choice theory); nor do I accept the rosy picture that majorities
are always capable of having their way (a staple of the older pluralist
literature). Instead, I consider both possibilities, as ones that institutional
designers must consider. As I said earlier, the key here is to aim for
convergence and that requires not only that the economic or political concept
might "work," but that there is some basis in the traditional legal canon that
recommends "fit" with the problem. The problem posed by the constitutive
provisions of the Constitution is to determine how one is to know the effects of
a shift in decisionmakers (or a shift from one aggregation of citizens to
another). Institutional economics and positive political theory provide us with
rough presumptions based on the size of the group. At the same time, this
notion that "numbers matter" and that the costs of decisionmaking matter fits
with very traditional constitutional law, law that reaches back to the Founders.
Reread a variety of literature from the founding period, and you will find
precisely this kind of assumption- that numbers and size matter in politics and
constitution-making, and in predicting the risks of constitutional design.222
Finally, I have insisted upon "relative" judgments or, to put it more
accurately, judgments based on the available alternatives.223One of the grave
and repeated misunderstandings of any theory of constitutional structureis that
it must assume that "democracy works" all the time or never. I have no
illusions; indeed, unlike many of my interlocutors, I have personal experience
of the pitfalls of governance. Yes, it is the worst government except all the
others. The important point to see here, though, is that adopting a constitutive
theory does not commit one to a view that representationworks, works well, or
even works most of the time. One may think that government in America is
troubled and that representation is a fraud. One would still want, in my view, to
ensure that the fraud was distributed lest it be compounded. The separation of
powers is about distributing power, where power means aggregation of citizens.
Representation, for good or ill, and for all the agency problems it possesses, is a
problem distinct from the separation of a given set of agency relations. I do not
assert here that representationworks, but only that a shift in constituencies may
make relative changes in constitutional structure with real effects on the

222. TheFederalist No. 5 1 is the canonical citation for this propositionas it opines that
the "ambition"(otherwise, the incentives) of the departmentsmust be made to counteract
each other). The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961); see also
supra note 45 (discussing the importance of the concepts of the "few" and the "many"
among other numerical judgments during the constitutional convention); supra note 46
(discussing notions of "dependence"and "independence,"which were proxies at the time for
judgments about the future behavior of government actors and how relationshipsbetween
governmentalactors would produce certain kinds of incentives; a judgment that one actor
was "too" dependenton another,for example, was a claim that he would have too great an
incentive to act as the other).
223. James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening
Divide Between America and Europe 16-17 (2003) (arguingthat "relativeclaims can be a
good bit more revealingthanabsoluteones").
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representativerelation distinct from the standardagency problems.
D. Popular Constitutionalism:A Coda
In a wonderfully imaginative book published in 1994, Richard Parker
identified what I believe to be the great pathology of late twentieth-century
constitutionalism: "[W]e constitutional lawyers," he argued, "have fed on
disdain for the political energy of ordinary people."224 During the past forty
years, structuraltheory has become a debate largely about lawyers and courts,
and their relation to the administrative state. Many have noted that all that
"formalism"and "functionalism" seem to describe, as constitutional theories, is
a mood, an intuition, or a result.225Indeed, one might go so far as to say that
there is only one real difference between these two views: If one approves of
the New Deal, one finds oneself in the functionalist camp (because one must
find some rationale for the administrative state); otherwise, one tries to find a
way to accommodate the formalist cases in a nonformal world.
This is not even an excuse for a theory of a whole constitution. And, lest
one think that the theories that we teach have no influence on law, one need
only look to the output of the Supreme Court in the past few years. Recall the
great political cases involving different presidents, but the same judiciocentric
self-regard. Think of Clinton v. Jones and read about the man who "just
happened to be President."226Or think of Bush v. Gore and read nary a mention
of the Constitution's remission of electoral contests to Congress, ratherthan the
courts.227 These are deeply self-referential decisions, decisions that reveal
enduring misunderstandings about the political provisions of the Constitution.
If there is anything that a vertical approach helps us to see it is that: Regardless
of what we think about the state of modern government, if we erase politics
from the Constitution, we risk erasing the people. As Bruce Ackerman has so
richly warned us, over and over again, history tells a story in which the people
have- for over two hundred years- found ways to change a system that
refuses to recognize their sovereignty. And the "ways" that they have found
have been through what we conventionally call the "separationof powers."228

224. Parker, supra note 208, at 66.
225. See, e.g., Tushnet,Bowls and Plateaus, supra note 37, at 581-85 (questioningthe
real differences between formal and functional approaches and considering them largely
rhetorical).
226. For a discussion of Clinton v. Jones in greater depth, see Nourse, Vertical
Separation,supra note 37, at 768-72.
227. It is widely held, even by scholars who tend toward supportof strong executive
power, that the Constitutionand federal law remit disputed electoral contests to Congress.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi,A Political Question, in Bush v. Gore: The Question of
Legitimacy 134, 138-39 (Bruce Ackermaned., 2002). According to Calabresi,"The failure
... to considerCongress's constructiverole was a mistake."Id. at 135.
228. See, e.g., ACKERMAN,
supra note 14, at 21-25.
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A constitution constitutes, it creates, it unleashes power in ways that live.
My point here is not the traditional one about the "lived" constitution- that the
Constitution must "keep up" with the times. In fact, as a matter of structure,
that is deeply wrong. On structuralmatters, I am decidedly conservative: I am
deeply reverent of the Founders' pragmatic vision, and I believe strongly that if
there is any place caution is merited in constitutional law, it is in the structure
of the document. Change our representational structure and you change our
form of government; Madison knew this, and he knew that the form of
government resided, in the end, in the hands of the people.229 A generative
anatomy thus describes something that must continue to happen, that is in a
sense absent from the text because it resides in the future and thus lives. It is
thus dynamic and must be so.230
It is precisely because the Constitution gives life to government that it must
change even if its texts stay the same. To ignore this force, to see the document
as only constraint, is to risk seeing the Constitution as empty of the people it
constitutes.231If the new wave of scholarship on popular constitutionalism is to
prevail over older modes, it should not be seen as a new constitutional
methodology, but instead as a new constitutional humility, as courts and
scholars begin to understand their place in the constitutional order. May this
structuralanatomy assist us in making such a vision appear not only important,
but possible. May it lead us to rethink our obsession with judicial review and
consider that the first question must be one of constitutional structure, as a
whole.

229. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 46:
The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their
reasoning on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as
mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to
usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error.
They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides
in the people alone ....

The Federalist No. 46, at 3 15 (JamesMadison)(JacobCooke ed., 1961).
230. See, e.g., Dewey, supra note 1, at 14. According to Dewey, "A thinking being
can, accordingly,act on the basis of the absent and thefuture."Id.
231. See Arendt, supra note 13, at 155-56.

